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Abstract For any game, we provide a justification for why in the long-run
outcomes are mostly both efficient and egalitarian/symmetric in the Rawlsian
sense. We do this by constructing an adaptive dynamic framework with four
features. First, agents select rules to implement actions. Second, rule selection
satisfies some minimal payoff monotonicity: rules that do best are chosen with a
positive probability. Third, in choosing rules agents are subject to ”small” random
mutation. Fourth mutation is payoff-dependent with agents mutating more when
they do badly than when they do well. Our main result is: if the set of feasible
rules R is sufficiently rich then outcomes that survive maximise the payoff of the
player that does least well. We also show that if R is restricted to those that
do best-reply on uniform histories then outcomes that survive are efficient and
egalitarian amongst the set of minimum weak CURB sets. Finally, we consider
long-run outcomes assuming mutation is payoff-independent; in contrast to our
strong selection result above, in this case we show indeterminacy: any outcome
can survive if R is sufficiently rich.
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1 Introduction
An important objective of the literature on evolutionary dynamics has been to provide
insights into equilibrium selection. Which equilibrium, or more generally outcome, will
be selected/survive in the long-run? Our aim in this paper is very much in line with
this objective. Specifically, we provide a fairly general dynamic framework to explain
why in the long-run only outcomes that are both efficient and egalitarian (symmetric)
in the Rawlsian sense are mostly observed.
While rest points of most adaptive evolutionary models with deterministic dynamics
are closely related to the concept of Nash equilibrium, these models have not been
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successful in addressing the question ”which equilibrium” because they are typically
non-ergodic and/or may have long-run behaviour that do not correspond to a Nash
equilibrium. One approach to “which equilibrium” question is to introduce ”small”
amount of perpetual random mutation/shocks into adaptive evolutionary models and
consider outcomes that will be ”mostly” observed in the long-run. These outcomes
are called stochastic stable (or SS for short); formally they correspond to the support
of the limit of the invariant distribution of the dynamics as the mutation becomes
arbitrarily small. The SS approach was pioneered by Foster and Young (1990), Kandori
et al. (1993) and Young (1993). It has been successful in selecting between strict Nash
equilibria in specific applications.1
Our framework is similar to the SS approach; however we differ from most of the
literature on two issues: rules and mutation. The SS approach typically assumes that the
agents in the population follow some fixed adaptive rule (such as best reply or imitation).
However, it turns out that the specific equilibria selected in these models depend very
much on the adaptive rules allowed. For example, in 2 × 2 coordination games with
two Nash equilibria, best response dynamics (choosing an action that is a best reply to
frequency distribution of past actions) selects the risk dominant equilibrium (Kandori
et al. (1993) and Young (1993)), whereas imitation dynamics (choosing an action that
performed best on average in the past) selects the efficient equilibrium (Robson and
Vega-Redondo (1996)). Therefore, to answer the “which equilibrium” question, we need
to explore the dynamics in which multiple rules coexist. The possibility of heterogeneous
rules, however, is not just a matter of equilibrium selection. It is simply not plausible
that a single behavioural rule can capture all important properties of human behaviour.
Once one allows for the possibility of multiple rules, it is important to allow for
selection and competition between rules.2 While rules do not change very often, agents
do revise these policies intermittently; thus, in playing a game, players not only change
their actions, but also revise rules that dictate the actions they choose.
Our first departure from the typical work on SS is that evolution in this paper is
at the level of rules; thus we allow for multiple rules and consider their selection and
evolution. Specifically, our evolutionary model, consisting of a single population of
1Sone surveys of deterministic and stochastic evolutionary dynamics are Weibull (1995), Samuelson
(1997), Young (1998a), Fudenberg and Levine (1998) and Wallace and Young (2014).
2Kaniovski et al. (2000), Juang (2002), Josephson (2009) and Schipper (2009) discuss models with
2 or 3 rules. All the references except the second do not allow players to revise their rules.
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agents randomly matched to play an N -player normal form game repeatedly, has the
following features: (i) there is a set of feasible rules, where a rule is a mapping from the
(finite) set of histories to the action set, (ii) agents adopt rules to play the role of each
player and the actions chosen by agents in each role at each date is dictated by the rule
she follows, (iii) at the beginning of each date every agent has the opportunity to revise
her rule according to some evolutionary selection criterion that satisfies some minimal
monotonicity condition that says a rule is chosen with a positive probability if it has done
best in the past (henceforth, we use wpp to refer to ”with a positive probability”) and
(iv) selection of rules at any date allows for the possibility of mutation. Our framework
is very general as we impose minimal restrictions on the underlying game, the set of
feasible rules and the rule selection criterion.3
Most of the literature on SS also assumes exogenous mutation. One exception is
Bergin and Lipman (1996) who show that, for any adaptive dynamics with finite state
space, every long-run prediction of the system without mutation is SS if every arbitrary
state-dependent mutation is allowed. Thus, it follows from Bergin and Lipman (1996)
that selection results such as those by Kandori et al. (1993) and Young (1993) do not
necessarily hold with state-dependent mutation.
But what does mutations supposed to represent? One common answer, experimenta-
tion, is difficult to reconcile with the constant rate of mutation across histories/states.
Surely agents experiment less in a state with high payoff than in a state with low
payoff.4 Our second departure from the SS literature is payoff-dependent mutation.5
Specifically, we assume mutation is ”less” likely (has a lower order of magnitude) in
states in which the agent is doing well than in states that the agent is doing badly (our
mutation assumption is similar to the perturbation assumption in Myerson’s notion of
Proper equilibrium).6
3Alternatively, we can think of our set-up as an evolutionary framework applied to repeated games,
where rules represent strategies in the repeated game and the evolutionary selection criterion describes
how agents choose between different repeated game strategies at each date.
4There is also strong evidence that bacteria mutate when they are under stress, i.e. when they
are poorly adapted to their environment (Bjedov et al. (2003)). Such mutations, known as stress-
induced mutagenesis, have also been discovered in other organisms, including yeast, algae, nematodes,
flies, human cancer cells and plants (Ram and Hadany (2014), Fitzgerald et al. (2017) and references
therein).
5Maruta (2002), Blume (2003) and Bilancini and Boncinelli (2020) consider payoff related mutation
and selection issue in symmetric 2 × 2 games. van Damme and Weibull (2002) model mutation rates
as mistake probabilities that are endogenously determined by effort levels that are set by agents and
show that selection of risk-dominant outcome in 2× 2 games holds in their framework.
6There is some experimental support for the assumption that mutation is payoff-dependent. Lim
3
Given the above features, we obtain very sharp selection results for any arbitrary
game. Our main result is that, for any normal form game, if the set of feasible rules is
sufficiently rich then any SS outcome must maximise the payoff of the player that does
least well - henceforth, we shall refer to any such outcome as MaxMin norm.7 Thus,
any SS must be both efficient and egalitarian in Rawlsian sense. Therefore, in common
interest games, our result implies that the strictly Pareto-dominant outcome will emerge
in the long-run. In Nash bargaining games, the SS allocation maximises the share of the
player that receives the least payoff in the allocation; thus if the underlying bargaining
game is symmetric, then equal shares are the solution. Our result does not necessarily
select an equilibrium, as MaxMin norms may not be Nash. In the Prisoners’ Dilemma
game, for example, our framework selects cooperation (a non-Nash outcome), as it is
the unique MaxMin norm.
The selection of MaxMin norm is established by showing that if the set of feasible
rules is sufficiently rich, then MaxMin outcomes are more difficult to escape from and
no harder to reach than non-MaxMin outcomes. Very informally, there are two reasons
why this is the case in our framework. First, our payoff-dependent mutation implies
that the likelihood of a single mutation out of a MaxMin norm is less than that out of
any non-MaxMin norm, as the payoff of any agent that does least well in the latter is
less than the payoff of every agent in the former. Second, given that selection is at the
level of rules and the set of feasible rules is sufficiently rich, reaching a state in which
a MaxMin norm a is played from any state is no harder than reaching any other state.
This we show by constructing a rule profile r = (r1, .., rN), where rn is the rule that
specifies how to play the game in the role of player n, such that wpp (a) for each n,
starting at any state, with at most one mutation, all agents adopt rule rn and (b) once
all agents adopt the profile r, with at most one mutation all agents will end up playing
a MaxMin norm a. If r is feasible then reaching a state in which a is played is no harder
than reaching any state in which a is not chosen.
The property in (a) above effectively describes an invading ability as it says that,
and Neary (2016) and Mäs and Nax (2016) consider deviations (mutations) from myopic best-response
in repeated coordination games in experimental setting. They find that the probability of such mutation
is higher the lower the payoff from not mutating.
7The concept of MaxMin norms was introduced into stochastic evolutionary dynamics by Young
(1998b). In that paper, he describes contract games and shows that, with state-independent mutation,
a SS conventional contract is efficient and approximates MaxMin norms. In our framework, our result
selects MaxMin norms exactly in general games under payoff-dependent mutation.
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with a single mutation in each role, r can invade the population and that in (b) describes
a triggering attribute as it says if all agents use r then with a single mutation it can be
triggered to play a eventually. Given our selection criterion that at each date a rule is
chosen wpp if it has done best in the past, the invading property is ensured if rn does
best response at some point after invasion. The triggering property of starting with r
and eventually playing MaxMin a after a single mutation has the flavour of ”a secret
handshake” - the single mutation effectively triggers r to eventually play a forever.8
Since a rule is a mapping from histories to actions, it is possible for a rule to satisfy
both properties by playing best response at some point after invasion and a after the
secret handshake triggering mutation. In fact, there is a large set of rules that satisfy
both the invading and triggering properties (see Section 4). For our selection result, all
that is needed is that the set of feasible rules contains some such rules.9
As mentioned above, our selection result may select a MaxMin norm a that is not
Nash. Since this means playing a repeatedly in a SS state, the rule(s) that are used in
such a state must play a if a has been played by all in the past. However, by appealing
to some rationality arguments, it may be argued that at any history in which the same
action profile has been played repeatedly, agents will choose a (myopic) best response to
that action profile as they extrapolate that the same action profile will be played in the
future; thus, a cannot persist indefinitely if a is not Nash. In the paper, we also consider
the case when the set of feasible rules is restricted to playing best response when the
history of actions has been uniform. Although such a restriction is inconsistent with
every SS inducing a non-Nash MaxMin norm, we are still able to obtain a selection result
that has the flavour of MaxMin norm. Very roughly, with this restriction we show that
any SS outcome maximises the payoff of the player that does least well amongst all
outcomes that are Nash - more precisely the selection is amongst the set of minimum
weak CURB sets (a set-theoretic generalisation of Nash equilibrium).10
8In the literature (e.g. Robson (1990), Fudenberg and Maskin (1990), and Binmore and Samuelson
(1992)) secret handshake allows a group of mutants to recognise each other, and thereby cooperate
amongst themselves and punish those outside the group, and invade. Here, the idea is somewhat
different: all agents are using the same rule profile r and a single mutation to a secret handshake
triggers all agents using r to change behaviour so that a will happen eventually.
9As mentioned in footnote 3, our framework can be thought of as applying evolutionary arguments
to selecting strategies in repeated games. However, in contrast to the repeated game literature, our
analysis for why efficiency and egalitarianism may evolve does not involve constructing rules that
incentivise players to choose a norm on the basis of future punishment and rewards; the two features
of being invading and triggering that we need some feasible rules to have are not necessarily about
behaviour that induces appropriate intertemporal incentives.
10In the extension, we also provide some conditions on birth of new rules that ensure selection is
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Our selection results are driven by the assumption that mutation rate by any agent
depends inversely on the payoffs the agent obtains in the past. To bring out the impor-
tance of this assumption we also consider the case in which mutation rate is history-
independent (and thus independent of past payoffs), as in most of the literature on
SS. Under this alternative mutation assumption, we obtain the opposite of the strong
selection stated above: any outcome is SS if the set of feasible rules is sufficiently rich.
Such indeterminacy result with history-independent mutation arises because, for any
outcome a, we can construct rules that are invading and triggering towards a. Effec-
tively, the existence of such rules implies that drift between any pair of outcomes can
be achieved through a minimal (and equal) number of mutations; but then since with
history-independent mutation the likelihood of moving from one outcome to another in
the long-run depends only on the number of mutations, all outcomes are SS and can
survive in the long-run.
Given this indeterminacy claim, we conclude that the selection results obtained in
the literature on evolutionary models with small random history-independent mutation
depend critically on limiting the set of feasible rules (e.g. restricting the set to best-
reponse or imitation rules), as indeterminacy and a “folk theorem type result” seem
inevitable if the set of feasible rules is sufficiently rich. Excluding some rules of behaviour
from the outset may of course be reasonable if there is good a priori reasoning for
restricting agents’ behaviour. For example, for reasons mentioned above, we could
restrict the set of feasible rules to those that best reply at uniform histories. We show
that under this restriction any Nash equilibrium (in fact any minimum weak CURB set)
is SS if the set of feasible rules is sufficiently rich and mutation is history-independent.
This implies that, under history-independent mutation, to obtain any selection between
Nash equilibria (or minimum weak CURB sets), we need to impose more restrictions
on the set of feasible rules than best reply at uniform histories.
Finally, we like to briefly discuss an important feature of our results regarding speed
of convergence.11 The literature on SS is sometimes criticised on the grounds that
convergence to a SS state can be too slow. For example, in models in which all agents
are assumed to follow best response rules (e.g. Kandori et al. (1993) and Young
(1993)), the number of mutations needed for the system to switch from one equilibrium
amongst Nash equilibria.
11We like to thank Larry Samuelson for emphasising the importance of this feature to us.
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to another has to be increasing in the population size. When the latter size is large
and the mutation rate is small, the chance that such a switch occurs is extremely small.
This implies that the time it takes for a system to converge to any SS outcome could
be unreasonably long.12 Such a criticism does not apply to our results as the number
of mutations needed in our framework to reach a state in which a particular outcome
(e.g. MaxMin norm) is played is most minimal (at most N + 1: one for each of the
N roles plus an additional one to induce triggering) and independent of the size of the
population. Effectively, since both invading in any role and the secret handshake require
at most one mutation, the time taken to reach a long-run outcome does not need to
increase with the number of agents.
The plan of the paper is as follows. In Section 2 we describe the model. An overview
of the main results is given in Section 3; we also provide a sketch of some of the arguments
in this section. In Section 4 we provide detailed results. Section 5 describes how our
results can be extended when some of our assumptions are relaxed. The proofs of all
the claims in Sections 4 and 5 are in the Appendix and Online Appendix.
2 Underlying Game and Evolutionary Dynamics
One-shot game. The stage game is a normal form game denoted by G = {An, πn}Nn=1,
where N is the number of players (with some abuse of notation, we also use N to denote
the set of players) and, for any player n, An is the set of finite (pure) actions and πn : A→
R is the payoff function, where A ≡ A1 × ...×AN . For any N -tuple x = (x1, .., xN), xn
and x−n respectively refer to the n-th component and all components other than n. For
any n and any a ∈ A, player n’s best reply to a−n is Bn(a−n) ≡ arg maxa′n∈An πn(a′n, a−n);
we also use the notation Bn(a) to denote Bn(a−n). Let B(a) = ×nBn(a). For simplicity,
we assume, for all n, πn(a) 6= πn(a′) if a 6= a′. Denote the set of (pure) Nash equilibria
in G by E, with e a typical element of E (the set E could be empty).
Repeated matching game. There is a single population consisting of I agents (we
also use I to denote the set of agents). At any discrete date t = 1, 2, ..., each member
of the population is randomly matched with N − 1 other agents to play the stage game
G in the role of some player. For simplicity, assume that at each date all agents are
12Convergence can be fast if the interaction between agents is through a network and agents respond
only to the choices of their neighbours (see Young (1998a)). Similar kind of fast convergence can also
be obtained without local interactions if payoff gains from switching between equilibria and mutation
rates are sufficiently high (e.g. Kreindler and Young (2013)).
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randomly matched to play the game, i.e. I = MN for some integer M . Hence, there
are exactly M matches in each period (we also use M to denote the set of matches). We
assume M > 1. Our results also hold for the case when M = 1; however, the analysis
is different, somewhat simpler and less interesting given some of the other assumptions
we make below; we discuss this case in Online Appendix. To simplify, assume also that
the probability of being assigned to any match or to any role is the same for all agents.
Our set up is standard except that in order to handle a general game with different
players we allow agents to take the role of different players. Thus, at each date every
agent cares about both the action profile in the match she participates in and the role
she plays in that match. Thus, the preference of each agent is over the set A × N .
Given that all agents are assumed to have the same payoff function πn(.) in each role
n, it follows that all agents are assumed to have identical preferences (even though the
payoffs function for different roles/players may not be the same).13
History and Rules. For any finite set X, denote the set of probability distributions
over X by ∆X and the set distributions over X with full support by Int(∆X).
We assume agents have finite period memory T : so they only recall the outcome
(action profiles) in the previous T ≥ 1 periods (we use T to describe both the memory
and the set {1, .., T}). For any period and any m ∈ M , am ∈ A denotes the outcome
in match m, and φ = (a1, .., aM) ∈ AM refers to the outcome of all matches. At
any date, denote the outcomes in the previous T periods, henceforth called history, by
θ = {am,t}m∈M,t∈T , where am,t ∈ A refers to the outcome T − t+ 1 periods ago in match
m. Let Θ ≡ AM×T be the set of histories. For any θ = {am,t}m∈M,t∈T ∈ Θ, define the set
of action profiles played in θ by A(θ) = {a ∈ A | a = am,t for some m ∈ M and t ∈ T}
and the action played in role n of match m and in the t-th period of θ by θm,tn = a
m,t
n .
Also, let θm,t = {θm,tn }n∈N and θt = {θm,t}m∈M . For any a ∈ A, let φ(a) ∈ AM be the
1-period outcome in which a is played in every match, and θ(a) ∈ Θ be the history
in which φ(a) is played in every period. Denote Θu = ∪a∈Aθ(a) as the set of uniform
histories. A history θ(a) ∈ Θu is called an equilibrium history if a ∈ E. A history θ is
called stationary if θt = θt
′
for all t and t′. Let Θs be the set of stationary histories.
When choosing an action in any role at any date, each agent adopts a rule to imple-
13Only ordinal ranking over A × N implied by (π1, .., πN ) is important for our results. Hence, the
results in this paper also hold if agents have different payoff functions in each role as long as they all
have a common preference ordering over the set A×N .
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ment her actions. A rule on how to play the game at each date in any role n ∈ N is a
mapping rn : Θ → ∆An from the set of histories to the set of probability distributions
over An.
14 For any θ ∈ Θ and Qn ⊆ An, rn(θ)[Qn] refers to the probability that rule
rn attaches to Qn when θ is observed. We denote the profile of rules by r = (r1, ..., rN)
and the probability that r chooses any a ∈ A by r(θ)[a] = ×n∈Nrn(θ)[an]. Also, let Rn
be the set of all rules in role n ∈ N and R = ×n∈NRn be the set of all rule profiles.
At any date, assume that the set of rules agents may adopt in any role n ∈ N is
some fixed non-empty subset Rn, henceforth called the set of feasible rules in role n, of
Rn. Let R = ×n∈NRn ⊆ R be the set of feasible rule profiles. When the meaning is
clear we drop the word profile from both rule profile and action profile.
Next we ask if there should be some restriction on the set R, and if so, what. One
restriction would be to require feasible rules to be deterministic (pure) i.e. R ⊂ Rpure,
whereR
pure
= ×n∈NR
pure
n andR
pure
n =
{
rn ∈ Rn |∀ θ ∈ Θ, rn(θ)[an] = 1 for some an ∈ An
}
.
By appealing to bounded rationality type reasoning, another natural restriction
might be to restrict rules to simple ones. The simplest rules are history-independent
ones that always take the same action. Denote the set of such rules, henceforth
called simple rules, in role n by Sn =
{
rn ∈ R
pure
n |rn(θ) = rn(θ′), ∀θ and θ′ ∈ Θ
}
. Let
S = ×nSn. Also, define the set of totally mixed simple rule profiles by Smixed ={
r ∈ R |r(θ) = r(θ′) ∈ Int(∆A), ∀θ and θ′ ∈ Θ
}
. We could also consider rules with
higher order complexity than simple ones. For example, rule profiles with ”complexity”
one level higher than Smay be those that do one action at some histories and another at
every other history. Denote the set of such rules, henceforth called 2-complexity rules,
by S2 =
{
r ∈ Rpure |∃a, b ∈ A s.t. r(θ)[{a, b}] = 1, ∀θ
}
.
A most common type of rule used in the literature is (myopic) best reply. Other
common rules are better reply, fictitious play, imitation and no regret learning. Some
of these rules are motivated by certain rationality considerations; others are not. A
most minimal rationality restriction on the set of rules is concerned with behaviour
at equilibrium histories. In such histories every agent in any role is taking the same
action and is obtaining the maximum payoff given the choice of the others in every
match of any period; hence, it is very reasonable to assume that the rules prescribe
14In the above definition, rules obey anonymity with respect to individual agent’s experiences as the
behaviour depends only on the history of actions. A more general type of rule might also depend on the
identity of the agents that adopt different actions in the previous periods. We adopt such anonymity
to simplify the analysis.
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the same equilibrium behaviour in the next period. This behaviour is satisfied by most
rules in the literature. Such rules, henceforth called equilibrium rules, is denoted by
RE =
{
r ∈ R |r(θ(e))[e] = 1 for all e ∈ E
}
.
Being an equilibrium rule imposes rationality restrictions only at equilibrium histo-
ries. Many typical rules used in the literature also impose some rationality restrictions
on non-equilibrium histories. For example, a weak restriction on the set of rules, hence-
forth called uniform best reply, is to play best reply at all uniform histories. Denote
this set by Ru =
{
r ∈ R |r(θ(a))[B(a)] = 1 for all a ∈ A
}
. A justification for restricting
rules to Ru is: if in the past the same action profile is played in every match at every
date then agents will assume that the same behaviour would be followed in the future
(particularly if T and/or M are large) and hence, play a best reply.
A stricter restriction than uniform best reply is to require any rule rn in role n to
best reply at any history in which the same action is played in all matches of any period
in all roles other than n, i.e. rn(θ)[Bn(a−n)] = 1 for any a−n ∈ A−n and θ ∈ Θ−n(a−n),
where Θ−n(a−n) ≡ {θ ∈ Θ | θm,t−n = a−n for all m and t }.
For histories in which other players do not play the same action, we could also require
rules in any role to play a best reply to some distribution over the set of actions observed
in the history. An examples of such a behaviour in any role is a rule that samples one
of the matches in θ and best replies to it wpp. We call such rules sampling best reply
and define the set of such rules by Rs = ×n∈NRsn, where for each n
Rsn =
rn ∈ Rn
∣∣∣∣∣∣ (a) rn(θ)[an] > 0⇒ an = Bn(θ
m′,t′) for some m′ and t′ and
(b) ∃ m and t s.t. ∀θ ∈ Θ, rn(θ)[Bn(θm,t)] > 0.
 (1)
One could also argue that rules should not depend on payoff-irrelevant features of
history; for example, they should be match-neutral in the sense that rules should be
sensitive only to past actions and not to the identity of matches in which the actions took
place. Formally, we say a rule r is match-neutral if, for any θ ∈ Θ and any permutation
of matches k : M →M , r({θm,t}m,t) = r({θk(m),t}m,t).
While many of the above restrictions (as well as several others) on the set R may
be reasonable, to widen the applicability of our results, we assume only the following:
Assumption on R: (i) R is finite and (ii) either S ⊂ R or R ∩ Smixed 6= ∅.
Restriction (i) above is assumed to ensure that the dynamics has a finite state space.
It imposes no restriction if the set of rules involve pure strategies only. Restriction (ii)
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is assumed to ensure that all actions can be played wpp at least through mutation.15
States. At any date, for any n ∈ N , m ∈ M and t ∈ T , let rm,tn ∈ Rn refer to
the rule adopted T − t + 1 periods ago by the agent in role n, in the mth match and
rm,t = (rm,t1 , ..., r
m,t
N ) be the rule profile adopted T − t + 1 periods ago by the agents in
the mth match. Also, let rt = (r1,t, ..., rM,t) ∈ RM be the rules adopted T −t+1 periods
ago in all the M matches. The set of T -period rule-histories is RMT . We then define
Ω ≡ Θ× RMT as the set of all states with typical element ω = {am,tn , rm,tn }n∈N,m∈M,t∈T .
Since the number of players, actions and rules, and players’ memory are all finite, the
state space Ω is finite.
For any state ω = {am,tn , rm,tn }n∈N,m∈M,t∈T , let θ[ω] = {am,tn }n∈N,m∈M,t∈T be the his-
tory of actions in ω, A(ω) ≡ {a ∈ A | a ∈ A(θ[ω])} be the set of actions played in ω,
R[ω] = {rm,tn }n∈N,m∈M,t∈T be the history of rules in ω, and Rn(ω) ≡ {rn ∈ Rn | rn = rm,tn
for some m ∈ M and t ∈ T} be the set of rules adopted in role n in ω. Let R(ω) =
×n∈NRn(ω). A state ω ∈ Ω is called uniform if θ[ω] ∈ Θu. A uniform state ω such that
A(ω) = a and R(ω) = r for some a ∈ A and r ∈ R is denoted by (θ(a), r).
Full history. At any date, the roles and the matches of each agent i in the previous
T periods are defined as follows. For any t, nt(i) ∈ N and mt(i) ∈ M respectively
refer to the role assigned to i and the match participated in by i, T − t + 1 periods
ago. We refer to υt(i) = (nt(i),mt(i)) as the assignment of i, T − t+ 1 periods ago and
υ = {υt(i)}i∈I,t∈T as the assignments over T periods. Let Υ be the set of assignments
over T periods. At any date if ω ∈ Ω is the state and υ ∈ Υ is the assignment, we call
h = (ω, υ) the full history of the previous T periods. Define the set of full histories by H
and the set of full histories associated with any ω ∈ Ω by H(ω) = {h ∈ H | h = (ω, υ)
for some υ ∈ Υ}.
Rule Selection and Inertia. Since agents have T -period memory recall, the selection
criterion used by any agent in any role is a mapping from the set of full histories H to
some distribution over feasible rules. For expositional simplicity, we assume that the
criterion for each agent is anonymous (i.e. the choice of the rule at each date depends
only on the state) and all agents in the same role use a common criterion to revise rules.
Definition 1 For any n ∈ N , a rule selection criterion ρn : Ω → ∆Rn is a mapping
which assigns a probability distribution over Rn for any ω ∈ Ω. Let ρ ≡ (ρ1, ..., ρN).
15The second restriction is not needed for some of the results. Also, we could replace it by the
assumption that there is action mutation (there is noise in the implementation of rules).
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To ensure asynchronisation of behaviour across different agents, we introduce inertia
both in selection of rules and in implementation of actions. Specifically, rule inertia
stipulates that at any date, if an agent is assigned the same role as in the previous
period then with probability pr ∈ (0, 1) she faces rule inertia and chooses the same rule
as she did in the previous period, and with probability 1−pr there is no rule inertia and
she chooses her rule according to the selection criterion ρn(.) for all n. Action inertia
stipulates that at any date, if an agent is assigned the same role and using the same
rule as in the previous period then with probability pa ∈ (0, 1) she faces action inertia
and takes the same action as she did in the previous period, and with probability 1−pa
there is no action inertia and she chooses her action according to her rule. When an
agent is assigned a different role from that in the previous period or is using a new rule,
we assume the agent is not subject to action inertia. The sequence of events at each
date is thus such that first agents are assigned matches and roles. Second, those subject
to rule inertia choose the same rule as in the previous period and agents not subject to
rule inertia revise their rules according to ρn for each role n. Third, agents subject to
action inertia take the same actions as in the previous period and agents not subject to
action inertia take actions according to their rules.
There are a number of points to note regarding the inertia described above. First,
we have assumed that rule inertia applies to agents only if they play the same role in
the previous period, and action inertia applies to agents only if they play the same role
and use the same rule as in the previous period. This is not the only way of introducing
inertia. We have adopted this approach because it seems more natural, even though the
analysis turns out to be significantly more complicated as a result of our specific inertia
assumptions. In any case the results in this paper do not depend on this specification of
inertia. Second, in the above we assumed that at each date roles and rules are decided
before action inertia. Again nothing hinges on such a specification. Third, inertia of
any kind is not necessarily needed to obtain many of the results (see Section 5).
Dynamics without mutation. The above describes a dynamical system that can
be represented by a Markov chain with state space Ω.16 The evolutionary process
16Since at any date the rule (action) an agent chooses when subject to rule (action) inertia depends
on the rule (action) chosen by that agent in the previous period, the dynamics of the system at any
date depends on the assignments υ ∈ Υ each agent has had in the previous T periods, in addition to
the state ω ∈ Ω. However, since the roles and the matches agents are assigned to are independent of
the identity of the players, the state ω ∈ Ω is still sufficient to describe the transition dynamics.
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starts at some initial state ω0 ∈ Ω. Given {G,R, ρ, pr, pa, ω0}, the system then evolves
with states changing from one period to the next. Hence, the dynamics of the system
Λ : Ω→ ∆Ω is a mapping which assigns to any state a probability distribution over the
set of states. Since the state space Ω is finite, the dynamics will eventually settle on one
of its recurrent classes within finite time. We denote a recurrent class of Λ by C ⊆ Ω and
the set of all recurrent classes by Γ. Also, let A(C) = ∪ω∈CA(ω) and R(C) = ∪ω∈CR(ω)
be, respectively the set of actions and rules that can occur in recurrent class C ∈ Γ.
Restrictions on the selection criterion. To preserve the generality of our results,
we like to impose minimal restriction on the rule selection criterion. One common
reasonable assumption is to assume that agents choose a rule from the existing ones:
Assumption (No-Birth): For any n ∈ N and ω ∈ Ω, ρn(ω)[rn] > 0 only if rn ∈
Rn(ω).
The above No-Birth assumption has a ”must see” feature in that it excludes the
possibility that agents select a rule that has not been played in the previous T -periods
of history. One consequence of the No-Birth assumption is that if at any state all agents
choose the same rule in a given role then that rule will continue being chosen in that
role, as there is no possibility of adopting a new rule (so with No-Birth, new rules
are possible only through mutation). The No-Birth assumption also implies that every
recurrent class C ∈ Γ must contain a unique rule profile (i.e. R(C) is singleton) because
once a rule is not chosen for T periods that rule will disappear forever.
Another restriction is to apply some rationality to ρ. A minimal notion of rationality
is that rules that receive the highest payoffs in the last T periods would be selected wpp:
Assumption (Monotonicity): Fix any n ∈ N , ω ∈ Ω and rn ∈ Rn(ω). Denote the
set of all matches and periods in which rn has been adopted by agents in role n in ω by
Dn(rn, ω) ≡ {(m, t) ∈M × T | R[ω]m,tn = rn}. Then ρn(ω)[rn] > 0 if
πn(θ[ω]
m,t) ≥ πn(θ[ω]m
′,t′), ∀(m, t) ∈ Dn(rn, ω) and ∀(m′, t′). (2)
Monotonicity assumption stipulates that rn ∈ Rn(ω) is chosen wpp at any state ω if
the payoff of any agent who adopted rule rn in role n in ω is no less than that obtained
by any other agent in role n in ω. This condition is weak because it requires a rule to
be selected wpp if it has done best in all of the periods it was used in the history.
We assume both No-Birth and Monotonicity. There are four remarks concerning
these assumptions. First, both are ”backward looking” as they require agents to recall
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the past T periods and, in any role n, (a) choose one of the existing rules and (b) if
there exists a rule that has done best in the last T periods then choose that rule wpp.
Second, No-Birth is a kind of imitation assumption in the sense that it assumes that
agents choose amongst rules that have been observed; this may not always be true. In
Section 5 we consider some alternatives to No-Birth.
Third, Monotonicity attributes a payoff to rule rn even for periods in which the
agents adopting rn were subject to action inertia. It may be more reasonable to apply
Monotonicity to matches in which rn has not been subject to action inertia, and the
actions implemented, and hence payoffs obtained, were the results of implementing rn.
Our results hold irrespective of whether the selection criterion applies when agents are
subject to action inertia or not: in our proofs, whenever we appeal to Monotonicity to
show that some rule rn is selected, we only consider states in which all agents in role n
are not subject to action inertia (and thereby implement their rules); see footnotes 43,
44 and 45.
Fourth, while Monotonicity does not require agents to know the details of the rules
adopted in all roles, matches and dates in the past T periods, it does require agents to
know wpp the rule(s) that did best in the history. Having some knowledge of the actual
rules adopted in the past and their performance may not be such a strong requirement.
After all individuals do have some ideas of how others (or at least those close to them)
react to past events; especially, information about successful rule of behaviour is often
publicly discussed and advertised. Nevertheless, it may be argued that such information
may not always be available. In Section 5, we consider the case in which agents only
know the past actions (and not the rules that actually adopted in each match in the
past) and show that our main selection results also extend in this setting.
Mutation. Next, we add mutation to the dynamical system Λ. Specifically, assume
that at each date, in selecting their rules, agents mutate with a small probability and
choose randomly a feasible rule. Mutation may come from players’ intentional exper-
imentation, involuntary trembles or mistakes, pure fantasy, or other factors. As we
mentioned in the introduction, the probability of mutation by any agent at any date
may depend on how well the agent has done in recent past. Formally, for any agent i
and any full history h ∈ H, we denote the probability of mutation (or mutation rate)
by i at h by εf(i,h) for some function f : I × H → (0,∞) and the random choice that
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i makes at h, conditional on mutating and being assigned role n, by some probability
distribution over feasible rules χn(i, h) ∈ Int(∆Rn). Thus, any agent i, conditional on
being assigned role n, with probability 1− εf(i,h) chooses the rule prescribed by the rule
selection criteria ρn, while with probability ε
f(i,h), she randomly picks a feasible rule
according to χn(i, h). Effectively, f(i, h) measures the resistance of i to mutation at
history h. Our mutation assumption implies that at any date every rn ∈ Rn is chosen
with a probability no less than mini ε
f(i,h)χn(i, h)[rn] > 0, for all n.
The precise sequence of events at each date for the dynamics with mutation is:
(i) Mutation: Each agent i at any full history h ∈ H mutates with probability εf(i,h)
or does not mutate with probability 1− εf(i,h).
(ii) Matching and Role assignment: Agents are matched and assigned roles.
(iii) Rules: If an agent has mutated and is assigned role n, she randomly picks a rule
in Rn according to χn(i, h). If an agent has not mutated and is assigned some role n
different from that she used in the previous period then she chooses her rule according
to the selection criterion ρn(.). If an agent has not mutated and is assigned the same
role n as in the previous period then with probability pr she is subject to rule inertia,
in which case she chooses her previous rule (in that role), and with probability 1 − pr
she is not subject to rule inertia, in which case she chooses her rule according to ρn(.).
(iv) Actions: If an agent is either assigned a different role from the previous period
or has chosen a different rule from the previous period then she implements her rule by
choosing the action prescribed by the rule. If an agent is assigned the same role and has
chosen the same rule as in the previous period then with probability pa she is subject to
action inertia, in which case she chooses her previous period action (in that role), and
with probability 1−pa she is not subject to action inertia, in which case she implements
her rule by choosing the action prescribed by the rule.
The precise sequence of events described above is not important for the results of
this paper. We could change the order of mutation, rule selection, matching and role
assignment, and implementation of actions, and the same conclusions will follow.
To simplify the exposition we make the dynamics with mutation anonymous by
assuming throughout that f is anonymous with respect to the identity of the agents:
for any permutation k : I → I,
f(i, (ω, {υt(i)}t) = f(k(i), (ω, {υ̂t(k(i))}t)) for all (ω, {υt(i)}t) ∈ Ω×Υ, (3)
15
where υ̂t is the assignment at t that satisfies υt(i) = υ̂t(k(i)) for all t.
As we argued in the introduction, the likelihood of mutating by an agent may depend
on her personal experience; in particular, it is higher when agents are doing badly than
when they do well. Formally, for any h = {am,tn , rm,tn , nt(i),mt(i)}n∈N,m∈M,t∈T,i∈I , denote
the payoff of each agent i in period t of full history h by πt(i, h) = πnt(i)(a
mt(i),t). Then
a most minimal restriction on mutation rates that reflects the idea that each agent’s
mutation rate is negatively correlated with individual’s recent payoff history is:
for all h, h ∈ H, f(i, h) > f(i, h) if and only if πT (i, h) > πT (i, h). (4)
We say agents are subject to history dependent mutation (henceforth, HDM) if f satisfies
(4).17 Note that HDM is a restriction on mutation rates for a given agent i across
different full histories. There is no restriction on mutation rates across different agents.
In this paper, we also compare our selection results under HDM with the more
standard set-up in which the mutation rates at any date are independent of the past.
We say agents are subject to history independent mutation (henceforth, HIM) if
there exists η ∈ (0,∞) s.t. f(i, h) = η for all (i, h) ∈ I ×H. (6)
The dynamics with mutation with arbitrary function f : I × H → (0,∞] is a Markov
chain with state space equal to full histories H. However, under either HDM or HIM,
we can also describe the dynamics with mutation as a Markov chain on the set of
states Ω (i.e. to define the transition dynamics, it is not necessary to describe the past
assignments). Clearly, this is the case with HIM as past assignments do not influence
mutation rates and hence the evolution of future states. With HDM, we have
Συ∈Υ Pr((ω, υ) | (ω, υ)) = Συ∈Υ Pr((ω, υ) | (ω, υ̂)), ∀ω, ω ∈ Ω and υ,υ̂ ∈ Υ, (7)
as f satisfies (3) and (4).18 But then by the lumpability result of Kemeny and Snell
17In (4) mutation rates at any date depend only on how well each agent has done in the previous
period. Our results under HDM also hold if mutation rates depend negatively on how each agent has
done in the entire T -period histories; in particular, they remain valid if we replace (4) by:
(a) ∀h, h ∈ H, f(i, h) > f(i, h) if πt(i, h) > πt
′
(i, h), for all t, t′ ∈ T
(b) ∀h, h ∈ H, f(i, h) > f(i, h) only if πt(i, h) > πt
′
(i, h) for some t and t′. (5)
Condition (5) is the most minimal condition consistent with the idea that mutation rates are negatively
correlated with payoffs in the T -period history. In the analysis below we adopt the stronger condition
(4) to simplify the analysis (see Footnote 19).
18The argument for (7) is as follows: For some permutation k : I → I , υ̂T (i) = υT (k(i)) for all
i. Let υ̃ ∈ Υ be such that υ̃t(i) = υt(k(i)) for all i and t. For all i, since υ̂T (k(i)) = υ̃T (k(i)), by
(4), f(k(i), (ω, υ̂)) = f(k(i), (ω, υ̃)); also, by (3), f(k(i), (ω, υ̃)) = f(i, (ω, υ)). Hence, f(k(i), (ω, υ̂)) =
f(i, (ω, υ)) for all i. Since k(.) is a permutation and the rest of the dynamics does not depend on past
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(1976) the dynamics over elements of Ω can be described by a Markov chain.19
The dynamics with mutation is ergodic and thus has a unique invariant distribution
that summarises the “long-run” behaviour of the process from any initial state. Fixing
f(., .) and χn(., .) for all n, we parametrise the dynamics with mutation and its invariant
distribution by ε and denote them respectively by Λε : Ω→ ∆Ω and µε ∈ ∆Ω.
We are interested in cases where mutation is arbitrarily small. Fixing f(., .) and
χn(., .) for all n, as ε approaches zero the invariant distribution µ
ε converges to an
invariant distribution µ of the unperturbed dynamics Λ. The states that µ attaches
a positive probability are SS states and are denoted by Ω∗ ≡ {ω | µ(ω) > 0}. Any SS
state ω ∈ Ω∗ is observed in the long-run when ε is arbitrarily small; hence any ω ∈ Ω∗
must belong to a recurrent class C ∈ Γ of the unperturbed dynamics Λ.
One way of characterising Ω∗ involves locating the recurrent class(es) of Λ with the
least stochastic potential (see Young (1993)). Define the resistance to mutation by any
set of agents I ′ ⊆ I at h ∈ H by
∑
i∈I′ f(i, h). Also, define the resistance between
two full histories h = (ω, υ) to h′ = (ω′, υ′), res(h, h′), as the minimum resistance
to moving from h to h′ in one period: Formally, let I(h, h′) ≡ {I ′ ⊆ I |the system
transits from h to h′ in one period wpp with mutation by some subset of I ′}; then
res(h, h′) = minI′∈I(h,h′)
∑
i∈I′ f(i, h) if I(h, h
′) 6= ∅ and res(h, h′) = ∞, otherwise. We
define the resistance between two states ω and ω′, r̂es(ω, ω′), as the least resistance to
moving the system from ω to ω′ in one period: r̂es(ω, ω′) = minh′∈H(ω′) res(h, h
′) for
any h ∈ H(ω).20
For any pair C and C ′ ∈ Γ, let res(C,C ′) be the least amount of resistance for
the system to switch from C to C ′ within finite periods.21 Also, let Ψ be the directed
graph in which each vertex corresponds uniquely to some C ∈ Γ, and for any C ′ and
C ′′ ∈ Γ with C ′ 6= C ′′ there exists a directed edge, denoted by (C ′, C ′′), connecting
C ′ to C ′′. For any C ∈ Γ, a C-tree, denoted by τC , is a spanning tree belonging to
assignments, (7) must hold.
19Describing the dynamics as a Markov chain over Ω is however not feasible under HDM if replace
(4) by the weaker condition (5) mentioned in Footnote 17. This is because (3) and (5) cannot guarantee
(7) when T > 1. So to prove the main results under HDM when (4) is replaced by (5), the analysis has
to be conducted assuming that the dynamics is a Markov Chain over H. This is feasible; however, the
exposition is more involved.
20By (3), minh′∈H(ω′) res(h, h
′) is the same for all h ∈ H(ω).
21Formally, for any distinct pair C and C ′ ∈ Γ, a path is a sequence of states ζ = (ω1, ..., ωk) for
some positive integer k with ω1 ∈ C and ωk ∈ C ′. The resistance of ζ is the sum of the resistances of
all the transitions: r̃es(ζ) =
∑k−1
`=1 r̂es(ω`, ω`+1). We define res(C,C
′) = minζ∈z(C,C′) r̃es(ζ), where
z(C,C ′) is the set of all such paths from C to C ′.
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the graph Ψ, such that from every vertex C ′ 6= C, there is a unique path directed
from C ′ to C. Let TC be the set of all such C-trees. The resistance of a C-tree
τ ∈ TC , denoted by res(τ), is defined by the sum of the resistances of all its edges:
res(τ) = Σ(C′,C′′)∈τres(C
′, C ′′). For any C ∈ Γ, the stochastic potential γ(C) is the
least resistance among all C-trees: γ(C) = minτ∈TC res(τ). We can then characterise
the set of SS states by Ω∗ = {ω ∈ Ω | ω ∈ C for some C ∈ arg minC′∈Γ γ(C ′)}.22 We
also say a recurrent class C∗ ∈ Γ is SS if C∗ ∈ arg minC′∈Γ γ(C ′) and denote the set of
all SS recurrent classes by Γ∗ = arg minC∈Γ γ(C).
3 Overview of the Results
In this section, we state the main results of the paper assuming HDM, and then the
indeterminacy results under HIM in order to contrast them with our main results. We
also provide sketches for some of our claims.
First, some additional notation. A set theoretic generalisation of strict Nash equi-
librium is the concept of minimum CURB set (Basu and Weibull 1990). Here, we define
another generalisation - minimum weak CURB set (Klimm and Weibull 2009). Fix any
n and Yn ⊆ An and let Y = ×nYn. Then B̃n(Y ) = {an ∈ An | an = Bn(a′) for some
a′ ∈ Y } is the set of best replies to Y for player n; let B̃(Y ) = [B̃1(Y ) × ... × B̃N(Y )].
Then Y is a weak CURB set (WCURB) if B̃(Y ) ⊆ Y . A set is a minimum WCURB
(MWCURB) if it is WCURB and contains no smaller WCURB sets. Let W be the set
of all the MWCURB sets in G. Clearly, a MWCURB set always exists and any such
set is singleton only if it is a (strict) Nash equilibrium.23
For any Y ⊆ A let u(Y ) = minn∈N and a∈Y πn(a). We call any a ∈ A that satisfies
a ∈ arg maxa∈A u(a) as a MaxMin norm and u = maxa∈A u(a) as the MaxMin norm
payoff. Similarly, we define any equilibrium e and any MWCURB Q that satisfy e ∈
arg maxe∈E u(e) and Q ∈ arg maxQ∈W u(Q) as a MaxMin equilibrium norm and MaxMin
MWCURB norm, respectively. Also, define uE = maxe∈E u(e) and uW = maxQ∈W u(Q)
as the MaxMin equilibrium norm payoff and the MaxMin MWCURB norm payoff,
respectively. These MaxMin terms can be trivially shown to satisfy the following.
Remark: (i) Any MaxMin norm a is efficient. Furthermore, if a ∈ A is efficient and
22This follows from Theorem 4 in Young (1993) and that, by the definition of r̂es(., .), , r̂es(ω, ω′) ≥ 0
and 0 < limε→0
Λε(ω)[ω′]
εr̂es(ω,ω′)
<∞, for any two states ω and ω′ ∈ Ω.
23MWCURB set is a refinement of the concept of minimum CURB set, as any minimum CURB set
contains a MWCURB set.
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πn(a) = πn′(a) for all n, n
′ ∈ N then a is the unique MaxMin norm.
(ii) Any MaxMin equilibrium norm e is efficient amongst the set of equilibria. Fur-
thermore, if e ∈ E is efficient amongst the set of Nash equilibria and πn(e) = πn′(e)
for all n, n′ ∈ N then e is the unique MaxMin equilibrium norm.
For any set of states Ω′ ⊆ Ω, with some abuse of notation, we define the minimum
payoff any player can obtain in all elements of Ω′ by u(Ω′) = minω∈Ω′ u(A(ω)).
Main Results - HDM. Our results depend on what rules are feasible. As argued
above, it may be reasonable to assume that only deterministic rules are feasible. Or it
may be argued, on the basis of some rationality reasoning, that at some histories rules
must best reply; e.g. requiring rules to best reply at all equilibrium histories may be a
reasonable assumption. Alternatively, bounded cognitive reasoning suggests that agents
choose rules that are not too complex.
Our first main result shows that under HDM if R is sufficiently rich to include some
pure equilibrium rule or some set of low complexity rules then the minimum payoff any
agent can obtain in any SS recurrent class is the MaxMin norm payoff u.
Theorem 2 Assume HDM. There exists r ∈ RE∩Rpure and R′ ⊆ S2 such that if either
(i) r ∈ R or (ii) R′ ⊂ R then u(C) = u for all C ∈ Γ∗.
As shown in Section 4, the choice r or R′ in Theorem 2 is not unique; the only
requirement for the result is that any one of them is feasible (R could of course contain
any other rule including non-pure, non-equilibrium or non-2-complexity ones). For any
C ∈ Γ∗, the claim in Theorem 2 that u(C) = u is equivalent to saying that every
a ∈ A(C) is a MaxMin norm. So the theorem is a very strong selection result as it
predicts that in the long-run only MaxMin norms are selected. Hence, we have:
Corollary 3 Assume HDM. If R includes either all pure equilibrium rules or all 2-
complexity rules then every action played in any C ∈ Γ∗ must be a MaxMin norm.24
It may be argued that neither all pure equilibrium rules nor all 2-complexity rules
are reasonable because these rules do not always satisfy other properties such as match-
neutrality or best reply at uniform histories. In Section 4, we show that if either M > 2
or T > 1 then r or R′ in Theorem 2 can be chosen so that they satisfy match-neutrality.
The choice of r or R′ in Theorem 2, however, may not satisfy uniform best reply
property if MaxMin norms are not equilibria. For example, suppose MaxMin norm a is
24Note that both RE ∩Rpure and S2 consist of pure rules and hence are finite.
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unique; then r and R′ we construct in Theorem 2 stipulate playing a at θ(a); but this
violates uniform best reply if a /∈ E. Our second main result provides a characterisation
of SS under HDM that is consistent with limiting the set of feasible rules to uniform
best reply ones. Specifically, we show that with HDM, under some weak conditions, the
minimum payoff any agent can obtain in any C ∈ Γ∗ is bounded below by the MaxMin
MWCURB norm payoff uW ; also, this lower bound binds if every r ∈ R best replies at
every uniform history wpp.
Theorem 4 Suppose HDM. (i) If N = 2 and R ∩ Rs 6= ∅ then u(C) ≥ uW , for all
C ∈ Γ∗. (ii) There exists r ∈ Ru ∩ Rpure such that if r ∈ R then u(C) ≥ uW , for all
C ∈ Γ∗. (iii) If R ⊆ {r ∈ R | r(θ(a))[B(a)] > 0, for all a ∈ A} then, in both (i) and
(ii), u(C) = uW for all C ∈ Γ∗.25
The assumption needed to ensure that u(C) ≥ uW for all C ∈ Γ∗ in Theorem 4 is
particularly minimal for the case with N = 2 as it only requires R to contain at least one
sampling best reply rule profile. For arbitrary number of players the assumption needed
is still weak because there are no restrictions on R other than feasibility of a specific
uniform best response rule. For games in which every MWCURB norm is singleton the
above characterisation will be in terms of MaxMin equilibrium norm.
Corollary 5 Assume HDM and either N = 2 and R∩Rs 6= ∅ or Ru∩Rpure ⊆ R. Then
in any C ∈ Γ∗ the minimum payoff any agent receives is bounded below by uW , and the
bound binds if R ⊆ {r ∈ R | r(θ(a))[B(a)] > 0, for all a ∈ A}. Also, if in addition
every MWCURB set is singleton, then every action played in any C ∈ Γ∗ is a MaxMin
equilibrium norm.
Results with HIM. We next characterise the set Γ∗ assuming HIM under similar
conditions as in our two main results. Our first claim is the analogue of Theorem 2:
Theorem 6 Assume HIM. Fix any a ∈ A. There exists r ∈ RE ∩ Rpure and R′ ⊂ S2
such that if either (i) r ∈ R or (ii) R′ ⊂ R then A(C) = a for some C ∈ Γ∗.
Thus, with HIM we can show the following total indeterminacy result.
Corollary 7 Assume HIM. Every action profile will be played in some SS state if R
contains either all pure equilibrium rules or all 2-complexity rules.
25We assumed that either S ⊆ R or Smixed∩R 6= ∅; hence, condition R ⊆ {r ∈ R | r(θ(a))[B(a)] > 0
for all a ∈ A} imply that the latter must hold.
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One way of obtaining some selection under HIM would be to restrict the set of
feasible rules. However, even if R is restricted to uniform or samply best reply rules,
indeterminacy with respect to the set of MWCURB may still persist.
Theorem 8 Assume HIM and fix any Q ∈ W . (i) If N = 2 and R∩Rs 6= ∅ then there
exists C ∈ Γ∗ such that A(C) = Q. (ii) There exists r ∈ Ru such that if r ∈ R then
there exists C ∈ Γ∗ such that A(C) = Q.
Corollary 9 Assume HIM. If either N = 2 and R ∩ Rs 6= ∅ or Ru ∩ Rpure ⊆ R, then
every Q ∈ W can be sustained in an SS recurrent class.
Note the contrast between the results under HIM with those under HDM. In the former,
the less restrictions we impose on the set of rules the larger the indeterminacy, whereas
with HDM the less restrictions are imposed the stronger the selection result.
Sketches for some of the ideas of the proofs. First, some additional notation. For
any m ∈M , a′ and a′′ ∈ A, let φ(m, a′′ | a′) ∈ AM be the 1-period outcome that involves
playing a′′ in match m and playing a′ in every other match and θ(m, a′′ | a′) ∈ Θs be
the stationary history consisting of playing φ(m, a′′ | a′) in each period. We refer to any
θ(m, a′′ | a′) such that a′′ differs from a′ in at most by one component (i.e. a′′−n = a′−n
for some n) by stationary 1-deviation history. For any m ∈ M , n ∈ N and a′−n ∈ A−n,
let Θ̂−n(m | a′−n) = {θ ∈ Θ | ∀t, ∃ btn and ctn ∈ An s.t. θt = φ(m, (btn, a′−n) | ctn, a′−n)}.
Any θ ∈ Θ̂−n(m | a′−n) is called a 1-deviation history. Clearly, Θ̂−n(m | a′−n) ∩ Θs =
∪a′n,a′′nθ(m, (a′′n, a′−n) | a′n, a′−n).
Two properties of rules are critical for our results: (a) 1-mutation from a ∈ A and
(b) invading. The former refers to rules that if adopted by all agents then with at most
one mutation the system reaches a recurrent class in which all play a in every match.
The latter are rules that if introduced through one mutation in each role, they will
eventually be adopted by all agents wpp. More formally, rn ∈ Rn is invading at C ′ ∈ Γ
if starting from C ′ with at most one mutation by any agent the system reaches wpp
some C ∈ Γ such that R(C) = (rn, R−n(C ′)); also r ∈ R is invading if rn is invading at
all C ′ ∈ Γ, for all n ∈ N . The selection results in Theorems 2 and 4 (for the case when
every Q ∈ W is singleton, i.e. W = E) is based on the following:
Claim1. Under HDM, for any a ∈ A, u(C0) ≥ u(a) for all C0 ∈ Γ∗ if there exists
r ∈ R that is 1-mutation from a and invading. Hence, u(C) = u for all C ∈ Γ∗ if there
exists r ∈ R that is 1-mutation from a, for some MaxMin norm a, and invading.
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Given that u(a) ≥ u(a) for any MaxMin norm a and any a ∈ A, the second part
of Claim 1 follows immediately from the first part. The assumption that there exists
r ∈ R that is 1-mutation from a and invading ensures that starting from any C0 ∈ Γ
with at most N+1 sequential mutations (one for each role and one to play a), by agents
that receive the lowest payoffs in the recurrent classes at which mutation takes place,
the system reaches some C ∈ Γ in which all agents play a. Given that mutation is
payoff dependent, this implies that, for any C0-tree, if u(C0) < u(a) then there exists
a C-tree with a lower resistance than that C0-tree; hence for all C0 ∈ Γ∗ it must be
that u(C0) ≥ u(a). The C-tree is obtained by adding and deleting edges to/from the
C0-tree. Figure 1 illustrates the argument when N = 2 and Rn (C
0) 6= rn for all n.
Given Claim 1, to demonstrate the selection results with HDM we need to show the
existence of a rule that is both 1-mutation from a and invading. First, consider rules
that are 1-mutation from a. Effectively, these rules can be triggered to play a in finite
time after receiving an appropriate signal through one mutation. There are many ways
to construct such rules. For example, when N = 2 and a is an equilibrium, any sampling
best reply rule r ∈ Rs is 1-mutation from a. To see this suppose the system is at some
ω ∈ Ω at date t such that R(ω) = r and A(ω) 6= a. Assume there is a mutation and the
mutating agent is assigned role n and the mutation is to a simple rule that plays an.
Then, at t + 1 all agents in role k 6= n wpp sample the mutant’s last period action an
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and play the best response ak to it. If at t+ 2 all agents in role k are subject to action
inertia and all in role n implement their rules, then a will be played by all wpp (all in
role k play ak by action inertia, the simple rule does an by assumption and rn also does
an as it is the best reply to ak). But then, by r ∈ Rs and a ∈ B(a), wpp all will play a
indefinitely.
When a /∈ E or N > 2, the sampling best reply rule r ∈ Rs may not behave as above
after mutation to a simple rule that plays an, and hence, it may not be 1-mutation from
a. Nevertheless, any rule r that behaves in a similar fashion as that described above is.
Specifically, for 1-mutation from a in the general case, we need (i) starting at any state
ω in which all use r with (at most) one mutation the system reaches a state with history
θ(a) and (ii) once θ(a) is reached, a will be played henceforth. The latter follows if
r(θ(a))[a] = 1. (8)
For the former, suppose that r(θ[ω])(a′) > 0 for some a′ such that a′n 6= an for some
n. Then one mutation to a simple rule that plays an in role n at ω moves the system
wpp to some state with history θ such that θT = φ(m, (an, a
′
−n) | a′) for some m. Then
a sufficient condition for (i) is r(θ)[a] > 0, as it ensures that after the mutation wpp
all will play a and hence, by action inertia the system reaches a state with history
θ(a). However, r(θ)[a] > 0 at all θ with θT = φ(m, (an, a
′
−n) | a′) is not necessary for
(i). In the proof we use a weaker condition. First, we require only that the triggering
starts at stationary history in which φ(m, (an, a
′
−n) | a′) happens at every date, i.e. at
θ(m, (an, a
′
−n) | a′). Second, we allow for the possibility that the triggering happens in
two stages: first agents in roles other than n play a−n and then agents in role n play
an (this 2-stage triggering allows for richer behaviour such as the sampling best reply
described above). One condition we use in the proof for triggering26 is
∀n and a′−n ∈ A−n, ∃ m s.t. for all θ ∈ ∪a′n∈Anθ(m, (an, a
′
−n) | a′) (9)
(a) r−n(θ)[a−n] > 0, if a
′
−n 6= a−n and a′n 6= an and (b) rn(θ)[an] > 0, if a′−n = a−n.
Rules that are invading must have some appropriate best reply properties. For
example, a set of sufficient conditions for r to be invading is (8) and playing best reply
26This condition is not necessary for ensuring triggering. For example, instead suppose we assume
the rule plays a at every non-stationary history; then starting from a stationary history, one mutation
can start the triggering by inducing a non-stationary history and thereby resulting in all choosing a
(see (15b) below).
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at all θ 6= θ(a) that are 1-deviation for some match:
∀n and a′−n ∈ A−n, ∃ m′ s.t. rn(θ)[Bn(a′−n)] > 0, ∀θ ∈ Θ̂−n(m′ | a′−n)\θ(a) (10)
The basic idea why this guarantees that rn is invading involves three steps: First,
starting from any state action inertia ensures that agents in roles other than n can play
some action profile a′−n persistently. Second, for any m
′, one mutation by any agent
to rn can induce some 1-deviation history θ ∈ Θ̂−n(m′ | a′−n). Third, the best reply
property at 1-deviation histories described in (10), together with (8), ensure that rn
does at least as well as Rn(C
′) wpp (assuming that all agents persist with playing a′−n),
and thereby, using Monotonicity, results in rn being adopted by all in role n.
From the above any r that satisfies (8), (9) and (10) is invading and 1-mutation
from a. Hence, (i) of Theorem 2 follows immediately from Claim 1 if the set of rules
that satisfy (8), (9) and (10) contains a pure equilibrium rule. This is trivially the case
if a ∈ E. In fact, in this case every pure rule in the set is a uniform best reply and the
set contains all sampling best reply rules when N = 2. Hence, the claim in (i) and (ii)
of Theorem 4 that u(C) ≥ uW = uE for all C ∈ Γ∗ must hold when W = E.27
When a /∈ E there also exists a pure equilibrium rule that satisfy (8), (9) and (10);
however, in this case, such a rule may not be match-neutral. Such match sensitivity is
however not necessary for our selection result, as neither (9) is necessary for 1-mutation
from a nor (10) is necessary for invading. We also show the existence of two alternative
sets of 1-mutation from a and invading rules that are match-neutral. In one alternative
(described in the next section) we preserve (10) and replace (9b) by one that requires
the rules to play a at histories that are neither stationary nor 1-deviation. When T > 1,
this modification ensures 1-mutation from a without excluding best reply behaviour at
every 1-deviation history. A pure and match-neutral example of such modification in
any role n is a rule that, for any a′−n, play Bn(a
′
−n) at any history θ other than θ(a) in
which all agents in roles other than n play a′−n (i.e. at every θ ∈ ∪mΘ̂−n(a′−n)\θ(a)) and
play an otherwise; see (16) below.
28 Another approach (considered in Online Appendix)
preserves triggering property (9b) and modifies (10).
To establish (ii) of Theorem 2, we extend Claim 1 to sets of rules; specifically,
27The inequality u(C) ≥ uW clearly binds if, for every C ∈ Γ, A(C) ∩W 6= ∅. We show that the
latter holds if R ⊆ {r ∈ R | r(θ(a))[B(a)] > 0 for all a ∈ A}, thereby establishing (iii) of Theorems 4.
28In the Prisoners’ Dilemma game, this example says that for any n: (i) Defect if there has been a
deviation from Cooperation in the past and all agents in the role of player k 6= n either always chose
Defect or always chose Cooperate in the past, and (ii) Cooperate, otherwise.
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u(C) ≥ u(a) for all C ∈ Γ∗ if there exists R′ ⊆ R such that each r ∈ R′ is 1-mutation
from a and at every C ′ ∈ Γ there exists r ∈ R′ that is invading at C ′. An example of
such R′ is the set of all 2-complexity rules such that: (a) every r ∈ R′ satisfies (8) and
(9) and (b) for each a′, R′ contains a rule that does B(a′) at every 1-deviation history
θ 6= θ(a); conditions (a) and (b) ensure respectively that each r ∈ R′ is 1-mutation from
a and at each C ′ ∈ Γ there exists r ∈ R′ that is invading at C ′. The existence of such
R′ then establishes (ii) of Theorem 2.
The indeterminacy results under HIM in Theorems 6 and 8 (when every Q ∈ W is
singleton, i.e. W = E) are based on the following claim.
Claim 2. Under HIM, for any a ∈ A, there exists C ∈ Γ∗ such that A(C) = a if
there exists r ∈ R that is both 1-mutation from a and invading.
The proof of Claim 2 is simpler than that of Claim 1: it involves showing that for
any C0 ∈ Γ∗ and for any C0-tree, there exists C ∈ Γ, with A(C) = a, and a new tree
with root C that has the same resistance as C0-tree. The new tree is obtained in by
adding and deleting equal number of edges to/from the C0-tree - the existence of a
feasible rule that is both 1-mutation from a and invading makes this exercise feasible.
Part (i) of Theorem 6 and Theorem 8 (when Q is singleton) then follow from Claim
2, given that every pure rule that satisfies (8), (9) and (10) is 1-mutation from and
invading, and the set of such rules (a) contains an equilibrium rule and (b) is a subset
of Ru and contains Rs if a ∈ E.29 Part (ii) of Theorems 6 follows by extending Claim
2 to sets of rules.
4 Proofs of the Theorems 2, 4, 6 and 8
Proofs of Theorems 2 and 4. We start with two definitions and a critical lemma.
Definition 10 Any R′ ⊆ R is 1-mutation from Q ⊆ A if for any C ′ ∈ Γ such that
A(C ′)  Q and R(C ′) ∈ R′, and any ω ∈ C ′, one mutation by any agent at ω moves
the system from ω wpp to some C ∈ Γ such that A(C) ⊆ Q and R(C) ∈ R′.30
29The existence of r ∈ R that is both 1-mutation from a and invading is more than what is needed
to establish Claim 2. Hence, our results under HIM can be obtained under a weaker condition than
the existence of a feasible rule that satisfies (8), (9) and (10); see the discussion at the end of the next
section.
30Throughout, the statement at state ω ∈ Ω refers to any situation in which the system is at some
h ∈ H(ω). Similarly, the statement one mutation by an agent at ω moves the system from ω wpp to
some set of states Ω′ ⊆ Ω refers to any situation in which the system is at some h ∈ H(ω) and then a
single mutation by the agent moves the system from h wpp to some h′ ∈ H(ω′) for some ω′ ∈ Ω′.
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Definition 11 Any R′n ⊆ Rn in role n is invading at C ′ ∈ Γ if, whenever R′n∩Rn(C ′) =
∅, for any ω ∈ C ′ there exists rn ∈ R′n such that one mutation by any agent at ω moves
the system wpp from ω to some C ∈ Γ with R(C) ∈ (rn, R−n(C ′)). Any R′ ⊆ R is
invading if R′n is invading at all C
′ ∈ Γ, for all n.
Lemma 12 Fix any Q ⊆ A and C0 ∈ Γ∗. Suppose there exists R′ ⊆ R such that R′ is
1-mutation from Q and invading. Then u(C0) ≥ u(Q).31
Next, we define three properties that ensure that a rule is 1-mutation from Q
and invading. To do so, for any n ∈ N and a′−n ∈ A−n, define Bn(a′−n | Q) =
arg maxan∈Qn πn(an, a
′
−n) as the Q-constrained best reply to a
′
−n. Denote the set of
uniform histories with actions in Q by Θu(Q) ≡ {θ′ | θ′ = θ(a) for some a ∈ Q}. The
first property, henceforth called Q-constrained property, requires playing actions in Q
if actions observed belong to Q:
r(θ)[Q] = 1 ∀θ s.t. A(θ) ⊆ Q. (11)
Condition (11) reduces to (8) when Q is equal to some a ∈ A. The second property is:
∀n and a′−n ∈ A−n, ∃ m s.t. for all θ ∈ ∪an∈Qn,a′n∈Anθ(m, (an, a
′
−n) | a′),
(a) r−n(θ)[Q−n] > 0, if a
′
−n /∈ Q−n and a′n /∈ Qn; and (12)
(b) rn(θ)[Bn(a
′
−n | Q)] > 0, if a′−n ∈ Q−n.
This property, henceforth called Q-triggering, says that, for any n and a′−n, there exists
m such that at any stationary 1-deviation history θ ∈ ∪an∈Qn,a′n∈Anθ(m, (an, a′−n) | a′)
the rule does with wpp (a) some action in Q−n in roles other than n if a
′
−n /∈ Q−n and
a′n /∈ Qn and (b) the Q-constrained best reply to a′−n in role n if a′−n ∈ Q−n.32 Condition
(12) reduces to (9) when Q is equal to some a ∈ A. The third property, henceforth called
Q-best, requires playing best reply at all θ /∈ Θu(Q) that are 1-deviation for some match:
∀n and a′−n ∈ A−n, ∃ m′ s.t. rn(θ)[Bn(a′−n)] > 0, ∀θ ∈ Θ̂−n(m′ | a′−n)\Θu(Q). (13)
Condition (13) reduces to (10) when Q is equal to some a ∈ A.
31The concept of a set R′n ⊆ R being invading at C ′ ∈ Γ requires one mutation by any agent to
result in invasion in the sense that wpp it result in all agents in role n to adopt some rn ∈ R′n. Lemma
12 also holds with a weaker concept of invasion that requires one mutation by any agent that receives
the lowest payoff in C ′ to induce invasion. In the paper, we adopt the stronger concept of invading
to simplify the exposition. In Subsection 2.2 of the Online Appendix, we use the weaker concept to
broaden the scope of our selection of MaxMin norm result.
32The definition of Q-triggering in (12) can be weakend somewhat by changing the order of the
quantifiers. To simplify the exposition, we adopt the definition in (12).
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Lemma 13 Fix any R′ ⊆ R and Q ⊆ A. Suppose every r ∈ R′ satisfies (11) and (12).
Then R′ is 1-mutation from Q.
Lemma 14 Fix any Q and r ∈ R such that (11) and (13) hold. Then r is invading if
either (i) Q ∈ W and r satisfies (12b) or (ii) Q is singleton.
We refer to any r that satisfies (11), (12) and (13) by a Q-rule and denote the set of
Q-rules by RQ =
{
r ∈ R |r satisfies (11), (12) and (13)
}
. Then, by Lemmas 13 and 14,
any r ∈ RQ is both 1-mutation from Q and invading if either Q ∈ W or Q is singleton.
Hence, by Lemma 12 (setting R′ to equal r) we have:
Proposition 15 Assume HDM. Fix any Q such that either Q ∈ W or Q is singleton.
Suppose R ∩RQ 6= ∅. Then u(C) ≥ u(Q) for any C ∈ Γ∗.
Assuming R ∩ RQ 6= ∅ is not too restrictive. First, the three conditions (11), (12)
and (13) are restrictions at 1-deviation histories and at histories in which only actions
in Q has been played; they do not put any restrictions at any other type of histories.
Second, consider the case when Q ∈ W . Then B(a′) ∈ Q for any a′ ∈ Q. Hence, in
this case, r ∈ RQ if and only if it satisfies (11), (12a) and
∀n and a′−n ∈ A−n, ∃ m′ s.t. rn(θ)[Bn(a′−n)] > 0, ∀θ ∈ Θ̂−n(m′ | a′−n) (14)
(this is because when Q ∈ W , (14) is equivalent to (13) and (12b)). Clearly, (11), (12a)
and (14) allow for pure rules and are consistent with each other.33 Also, (14) implies
best reply wpp at any θ ∈ Θu; hence, RQ ∩ R
pure
is a non-empty subset of Ru when
Q ∈ W . Also, with two players RQ includes all sampling best reply rules if Q ∈ W .
Lemma 16 Assume N = 2. If Q ∈ W then Rs ⊂ RQ.
The claims in (i) and (ii) of Theorem 4 that u(C) ≥ uW for any C ∈ Γ∗ follows
from Lemma 16, Proposition 15 and RQ ∩ R
pure
being a non-empty subset of Ru when
Q ∈ W . The claim in (iii) of Theorem 4 that, for any C ∈ Γ∗, u(C) = uW if R ⊆ {r ∈
R | r(θ(a))[B(a)] > 0, for all a ∈ A} then follows from the next lemma.
Lemma 17 Fix any C ∈ Γ. Assume R(C)(θ(a))[B(a)] > 0 for all a ∈ A. Then there
exists Q ∈ W such that Q ⊆ A(C); hence u(C) ≤ uW .
33A match-neutral examples of the set RQ ∩ R
pure
when Q ∈ W is a rule r such that, for any n,
rn(θ)[Qn] = 1 if θ ∈ ∪m,k 6=n,a′,ak 6=a′kθ(m, (ak, a
′
−k) | a′) and rn(θ)[Bn(σ)] = 1 for some σ ∈ ∆(∪m,tθm,t)
otherwise, where Bn(σ) is the best reply to σ. Another example, is rule r such that, for any n,
rn(θ)[Bn(a
′
−n)] = 1 if θ ∈ ∪mΘ̂(m | a′−n) for all a′−n and rn(θ)[Qn] = 1 otherwise.
27
Third, consider the case when Q is singleton and equal to some arbitrary a ∈ A.
Then (8), (9) and (10) respectively are equivalent to (11), (12) and (13), and hence
describe a-constrained, a-triggering and a-best properties. Thus, the set of a-rules is
given by Ra =
{
r ∈ R |r satisfies (8), (9) and (10)
}
. Note that any pure r ∈ Ra, by (8),
plays B(a) at θ(a) if and only if a ∈ E and, by (13), plays e at θ(e) if e ∈ E\a. Hence,
although Ra ∩R
pure
does not belong to Ru if a /∈ E, Ra ∩R
pure ⊂ RE for all a ∈ A.
Also, Ra is well-defined and contains pure rules. This is because (8), (9) and (10)
allow pure rules and are consistent with each other. Specifically, (8), (9a) and (10)
are consistent with each other because they apply at different histories. Condition
(8) is consistent with (9b) because both allow an to be played wpp. Finally, consider
(9b) and (10); the former requires, for some m, playing an at stationary 1-deviation
history θ(m, a | a′n, a−n) whereas the latter requires, for some m′, playing Bn(a′−n) at
any θ ∈ Θ̂−n(m′ | a′−n)\θ(a). Clearly, the two conditions are also consistent if (a)
a−n 6= a′−n, (b) an = Bn(a−n) or (c) m′ and m are distinct. Given M > 1, (c) is always
possible, and hence (9b) and (10) are consistent. However, when an 6= Bn(a) and the
rule is deterministic, such consistency is possible if and only if, for all a′n, rn plays
different actions at θ(m, a | a′n, a−n) and θ(m′, a | a′n, a−n) for some distinct pair m and
m′; thus consistency with both (9b) and (10) may require match sensitive behaviour.34
Fix any C ∈ Γ∗ and MaxMin norm a ∈ A. With HDM, by Proposition 15, u(C) ≥
u(a) if R∩Ra 6= ∅. Since u(a) ≥ u(a) and Ra∩R
pure
is a non-empty subset of RE, there
exists r ∈ RE such that if r ∈ R then u(C) = u(a). This establishes (i) of Theorem 2.
In Section 2 we mentioned that it may be appropriate to limit rules to match-neutral
ones on the grounds that behaviour should not depend on payoff-irrelevant aspects of
history. Although the set of pure a-rules includes match-neutral rules when a ∈ E,
as we argued above, this may not be the case if a /∈ E because in this case (9b) can
be inconsistent with (10). Our selection results, however, also hold with match-neutral
rules. We can achieve this by modifying either (9) or (10) in the definition of Ra. Below,
we consider modifying the former (as the analysis is simpler) and consider the latter in
34Such sensitivity of course is not necessary if an = Bn(a) or if the rule is mixed and plays both an
or Bn(a) with a fixed positive probability at every 1-deviation history θ(m
′, a | a′n, a−n) for all m′ and
a′n. An example of of a pure a-rule is any r that, for some m and any θ does the following : play a at
if θ ∈ θ(a) ∪ {∪k,a′k 6=ak,a′−k θ(m, (ak, a
′
−k) | a′)}, and play B(σ) for some σ ∈ ∆(∪m′,tθm
′,t), otherwise;
the behaviour this example stipulates is match sensitive if a 6= B(a).
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Online Appendix. Specifically, here we replace a-triggering (9) by the following:
(a) ∀n, r−n(θ)[a−n] > 0, ∀θ ∈ ∪m,a′,a′′n 6=a′nθ(m, (a
′′
n, a
′
−n) | a′) and
(b) r(θ)[a] > 0, ∀ θ ∈ Θ\{Θs ∪Θ−}. (15)
where Θ− ≡ ∪n,a′−nΘ
−n(a′−n) is the set of histories in which all agents in N−1 roles take
the same action. Condition (15a) is an a-triggering condition similar to (9a) for roles
other than n. Condition (15b) requires playing a wpp at any non-stationary history
θ /∈ Θ−; so if such a history is reached this condition triggers a. We refer to any rule
that satisfies (8), (10) and (15) by a-plus rule and denote the set of such rules by R+a .
Note the following. First, since Θs is empty when T = 1, (15b) imposes restrictions
only if T > 1. Second, by (8) and (10), R+a ∩R
pure ⊂ RE. Third, (15) admits pure rules
and is consistent with (8) and (10) as the set of histories at which (15) imposes restric-
tions is different from those at which (8) and (10) apply restrictions to. Furthermore,
R+a in contrast to Ra always contains pure rules that are match-neutral. For example,
R+a includes the pure and match-neutral rule r defined by: for any n and θ
rn(θ)[Bn(a
′
−n)] = 1 if θ ∈ Θ−n(a′−n)\θ(a) for some a′−n and rn(θ)[an] = 1 otherwise.
(16)
Next fix any r ∈ R+a ∩R. In Online Appendix (Lemma 39), we show r is 1-mutation
from a if T > 1. Also, given that r satisfies (11) and (13) for the case when Q = a,
by Lemma 14 (setting Q equal to a), r is invading. Hence, by Lemma 12 (setting Q to
equal a) we have:
Proposition 18 Assume HDM. Fix any a ∈ A and suppose R∩R+a 6= ∅. If T > 1 then
u(C) ≥ u(a) for any C ∈ Γ∗.
The inequality in Proposition 18 binds if a is set equal to some MaxMin norm a.
Hence, given that R+a ∩ R
pure
is a non-empty subset of RE and includes match-neutral
rules, there exists a pure match-neutral equilibrium rule r ∈ R+a such that if r ∈ R and
T > 1 then u(C) = u(a) for any C ∈ Γ∗; thus, if T > 1 then the result in (i) of Theorem
2 holds even if R is restricted to match-neutral ones. However, neither R ∩ R+a 6= ∅
nor T > 1 are necessary for selection of MaxMin norm result with match-neutral rules.
As mentioned above, in Online Appendix, we construct another set of rules, called R∗a
(obtained by modifying (10) in the definition of Ra), that contain pure match-neutral
equilibrium rules and is such that if R∩R∗a 6= ∅ then u(C) ≥ u(a) for any C ∈ Γ∗, with
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inequality binding if a is a MaxMin norm. These results are obtained for all values of
T , including T = 1 (for the latter case M has to exceed 2).
Next we turn to the proof of part (ii) of Theorem 2. Fixing a ∈ A, we need R to
include, for each b ∈ A, a 2-complexity rule r ∈ S2 that satisfies
∀n and a′−n, ∃m s.t. rn(θ)[bn] = 1 for all θ ∈ Θ̂−n(m | a′−n)\θ(a), (17)
a-constrained (8) and a-triggering (9).35 Formally, let
Ra =
R′ ⊂ S2
∣∣∣∣∣∣ ∀r ∈ R
′, (8) and (9) are satisfied and
∀b ∈ A, ∃ r ∈ R′ that satisfies (17).
 (18)
In Online Appendix (Lemma 40), we show any R′ ∈ Ra such that R′ ⊆ R is 1-mutation
from a and invading. Hence, by Lemma 12 (setting Q to equal a), we have:
Proposition 19 Assume HDM. Fix any a ∈ A. Suppose there exists R′ ∈ Ra such
that R′ ⊆ R. Then u(C) ≥ u(a) for every C ∈ Γ∗.
Also, Ra is clearly well-defined.36 Hence, Part (ii) of Theorem 2 follows from Propo-
sition 19 for the case when a is set equal to a MaxMin norm.
As with the case of a-rules, the behaviour of rules belonging to any R′ ∈ Ra may
also be match sensitive, as (17) and (9b) respectively require playing bn at θ(m, a |
a′n, a−n) and an at θ(m
′, a | a′n, a−n) for some m and m′ and for all a′n. Our selection
result for 2-complexity rules, however, also holds with match-neutral rules. In Online
Appendix (Proposition 44), we establish an equivalent result to Proposition 19, and
thereby establish (ii) of Theorem 2, with match-neutral 2-complexity rules.
Proofs of Theorems 6 and 8. First, we define a weaker version of invading.
Definition 20 Any R′n ⊆ Rn for role n is weakly invading (henceforth, w-invading)
at C ′ ∈ Γ if, whenever R′n ∩ Rn(C ′) = ∅, there exists ω ∈ C ′, rn ∈ R′n and i ∈ I
such that one mutation by i at ω moves the system wpp from ω to some C ∈ Γ with
R(C) ∈ (rn, R−n(C ′)). Any R′ ⊆ R is w-invading if R′n is w-invading at each C ′ ∈ Γ
for all n.
Lemma 21 Assume HIM. Fix any Q ⊆ A. Suppose there exists R′ ⊆ R such that R′
is 1-mutation from Q and w-invading. Then there exists C ∈ Γ∗ such that A(C) ⊆ Q.
35Condition (17) is similar to (10) except that the latter requires playing a best response at all
θ ∈ Θ−n(m | a′−n)\θ(a), whereas (17) requires playing a fixed action bn at all such histories.
36An example of a set of rules belonging to Ra is the set of rules ∪b∈Ar̃a,b where, for some fixed
match m, r̃a,b(θ)[b] = 1 if θ ∈ {∪a′−nΘ̂
−n(m | a′−n)}\θ(a) and r̃(θ)[a] = 1 otherwise.
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The above lemma enables us to state the following.
Proposition 22 Assume HIM. (i) Fix any a ∈ A. Suppose either Ra ∩R 6= ∅ or there
exists R′ ∈ Ra such that R′ ⊆ R. Then there exists C ∈ Γ∗ such that A(C) = a. (ii)
Fix any Q ∈ W . Suppose RQ ∩R 6= ∅. Then there exists C ∈ Γ∗ such that A(C) = Q.
Given that any r ∈ Ra and each R′ ∈ Ra are 1-mutation from a and invading (and
hence w-invading), part (i) of Proposition 22 follows from Lemma 21. Next, fix any
Q ∈ W . Since any r ∈ RQ is 1-mutation from Q and invading (and hence w-invading),
by Lemma 21, there exists C ∈ Γ∗ such that A(C) ⊆ Q. Also, by Lemma 17, there
exists Q′ ∈ W such that Q′ ⊆ A(C); but since A(C) ⊆ Q and MWCURB sets do not
intersect, Q = Q′ = A(C). This establishes (ii) of Proposition 22.
Theorem 6 follows from (i) of Proposition 22, Ra ∩R
pure
being a non-empty subset
of RE, Ra being well-defined and every R′ ∈ Ra being a subset of S2, for any a ∈ A.
Theorem 8 follows from (ii) of Proposition 22, Lemma 16 and RQ ∩R
pure
being a non-
empty subset of Ru, for any Q ∈ W .37
5 Extension
No Inertia. Action inertia allows for the possibility of persistence in actions in every
role; this enables us to show that, for any role n, rules that do best reply at histories
in which all in roles other than n take the same actions are invading. If there were
no action inertia, agents in roles other than n do not necessarily take the same actions
as in the past and hence rules that best reply to past behaviour of others may not be
invading. However, action inertia may be dispensable if, for all n, Rn were sufficiently
large so that, for each action profile that agents in roles other than n might take, there
is a rule rn ∈ Rn that does a best reply to it (as then some member of Rn can invade).38
37As explained above, a pure a-rule is not match-neutral if a /∈ E. Proposition 22, and hence Theorem
6, also hold if we assume R is pure and match-neutral; e.g. given that every feasible r ∈ R+a ∪ R∗a is
1-mutation from a and invading, the claim that in (i) of Proposition holds if {R+a ∪R∗a} ∩R 6= ∅.
Note also that since, for any Q, Lemma 21 requires the feasibility of some R′ that is 1-mutation
from Q and w-invading and Lemma 12 requires the feasibility of some R′ that is 1-mutation from Q
and invading, the scope of Proposition 22 is significantly wider than the claim in Proposition 15. For
example, replace the a-best property (10) in the definition of Ra by the weaker condition of requiring
best reply only at all θ ∈ Θu\θ(a). This set contains Ra, includes pure match-neutral rules and can
be shown to be 1-mutation from a and w-invading. Hence, by Lemma 21, if r contains one such rule
then the claim in (i) of Proposition 22 holds. However, since this set is not necessarily invading, its
feasibility is not sufficient to establish Proposition 15 for the case when Q = a.
38The argument is similar to the case of 2-complexity rules where we show that any R′ ∈ Ra is
invading.
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Rule inertia allows for persistence in rules. Since at any date the history of previous T
periods is relevant to Monotonicity selection criterion, rule inertia may be necessary for
a single mutation to succeed if T > 1; without it a single mutation may die immediately
after one period and hence our analysis would not carry if T > 1. However, rule inertia
may be dispensable if T = 1 or more generally if we strengthen the Monotonicity
selection criterion so that it depends only on the history of play in the last period.
Dispensing with action and rule inertia is indeed possible as we can show the follow-
ing without assuming action inertia (with or without rule inertia): if R is sufficiently
rich and the selection criterion is strengthened as suggested above then (a) with HDM
only MaxMin norms survive and (b) with HIM any outcome survives. Specifically, we
replace condition (2) in the Monotonicity Assumption by ∀n, ω ∈ Ω and rn ∈ Rn(ω), ρn(ω)[rn] > 0 if DTn (rn, ω) 6= ∅ andπn(θ[ω]m,T ) ≥ πn(θ[ω]m′,T ) ∀m ∈ DTn (rn, ω) and m′ ∈M , (19)
where DTn (rn, ω) = {m | (m,T ) ∈ Dn(rn, ω)}. For any role, (2) says any rule rn is
selected wpp at any date if the payoff it receives is highest in the previous T periods;
in contrast, according to (19) rn is selected wpp at any date if it performs best in the
previous period. Note when T = 1, (19) is equivalent to (2). Next, fix any a ∈ A, let
R̃a =
R′ ⊂ Rpure
∣∣∣∣∣∣ (a) ∀r ∈ R
′ and θ, r(θ)[a] = 1 if θT ∈ φ(a) ∪ {∪m,n,a′s.t.a′n 6=anφ(m, (an, a
′
−n) | a′)}
(b) ∀b ∈ A, ∃r ∈ R′ s.t. ∀θ, r(θ)[b] = 1 if θT ∈ ∪a′ 6=aφ(a′)

(20)
consist of sets of rules such that (a) every rule in this set plays a if the last period of the
history is either φ(a) or φ(m, (an, a
′
−n) | a′) for some m, n and a′ such that a′n 6= an, and
(b) for each b ∈ A there exist a rule in the set that plays b at all histories in which some
uniform outcome φ(a′), for some a′ 6= a, is played in the last period of the history. The
set R̃a is similar to Ra except that the behaviour prescribed by rules in Ra relates to
histories that are uniform or 1-deviation, whereas for R̃a it relates to histories in which
the outcome in the last period is uniform or 1-deviation.
Note that R̃a is well-defined as conditions (a) and (b) in (20) are restrictions at
different sets of histories. In fact, R̃a includes well-defined elements that consist of
match-neutral 2-complexity rules (an example is the set ∪b∈Ar̄a,b, where r̄a,b(θ)[a] = 1 if
θT ∈ φ(a) ∪ {∪m,n,a′ s.t. a′n 6=anφ(m, (an, a′−n) | a′)} and r̄a,b(θ)[b] = 1, otherwise).
Proposition 23 Suppose no action inertia and Monotonicity satisfies (19). Fix any
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a ∈ A and assume there exists R′ ∈ R̃a such that R′ ⊆ R. Then (i) under HDM
u(C) ≥ u(a) for every C ∈ Γ∗ and (ii) under HIM there exists C ∈ Γ∗ such that
A(C) = a.39
Parts (i) of and (ii) of Proposition 23 and their proofs are respectively similar to
Proposition 19 and 2-complexity part in (i) of Proposition 22 and their proofs. It follows
from (i) of Proposition 23 that if R′ ⊆ R for some R′ ∈ R̃a for some MaxMin norm a
then u(C) = u for every C ∈ Γ∗.
Relaxing Monotonicity: Selection When Rules Are Not Observable. Mono-
tonicity is a weak assumption except that it implicitly assumes that at any date agents
observe wpp the identity of the rule that performed the best in the previous history.
Here, we drop Monotonicity and extend our analyses to the case in which agents observe
past actions but not the identity of rules that were used to implement them.
To do this, we assume here that agents first identify actions in the observed history
that generated highest payoffs and then select existing rules that could have possibly
generated these best actions in the history. Since at each date agents only recall T -
period history, to identify rules that could have induced some specific outcome in the
history, agents need to make assumptions regarding what could have happened before
the history. We refer to any sequence of actions that could have happened before the
observed history by a pre-history, and describe rules that could have generated the
observed actions as consistent rules. Formally, rn ∈ Rn is said to be consistent with
θ ∈ Θ at (m, t) ∈ M × T given pre-history θ̃ ∈ Θ if rn(θ̃t, ..., θ̃T , θ1, ..., θt−1)[θm,tn ] > 0.
For any n, rn, θ, t and θ̃, let Mn(rn, θ, t | θ̃) ≡ {m | rn is consistent with θ at (m, t) given
θ̃}. Denote the set of matches at which the best payoff in θ at t in role n is achieved by
MBn (θ, t) ≡ {m | πn(θm,t) ≥ πn(θm
′,t′) for all (m′, t′)}.
Definition 24 Fix n. Rule rn is Justifiable at ω ∈ Ω if rn ∈ Rn(ω) and there exists
θ̃ ∈ Θ such that Mn(rn, θ[ω], t | θ̃) = MBn (θ[ω], t) for all t. Rule selection ρn(.) is
Justifiable if ρn(ω)[rn] > 0 for any ω and rn that is Justifiable at ω.
Thus, for a rule to be Justifiable at ω (and hence be selected wpp) it is sufficient to
demonstrate the existence of some pre-history θ̃ such that every action in θ[ω] that could
39Proposition 23 assumes no action inertia; however, it makes no assumption regarding rule inertia
as it is consistent with both rule inertia and no rule inertia. The proposition however, does not cover
the case when there is action inertia but no rule inertia; however, this case is somewhat uninteresting
because it is more likely that agents revise their actions more often than they revise their rules.
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have been induced by the rule given θ̃ generates the highest payoff in θ[ω]. It may be
argued that some pre-histories are more reasonable than others. For example, if in some
role n all agents have taken the same action a′n in state ω ∈ Ω, then it may be reasonable
to argue that in the definition of Justifiability only pre-histories in which all in role n
have taken action a′n should be considered. An even weaker selection criterion would be
to select any rule rn wpp if, for all pre-histories θ̃, Mn(rn, θ[ω], t | θ̃) = MBn (θ[ω], t) for
all t. Clearly, this property cannot hold at t = 1 if rn is history-dependent.
40 However,
our main results still hold if the selection criterion chooses Justifiable rules that, for all
pre-histories, induce the best actions after date 1.
Definition 25 Fix n ∈ N . Rule rn is s-Justifiable at ω ∈ Ω if it is Justifiable and
Mn(rn, θ[ω], t | θ̃) = MBn (θ[ω], t) for all θ̃ ∈ Θ and t > 1. Rule selection ρn(.) is
s-Justifiable if ρn(ω)[rn] > 0 for any ω and rn that is s-Justifiable at ω.
If T = 1, then s-Justifiable and Justifiable rules selection criteria are equivalent.
However, when T > 1, s-Justifiable is a significantly weaker selection criterion. Below
we sketch a brief intuition for why the main results of this paper hold if the selection
criterion is s-Justifiable, instead of Monotonic (see Online Appendix for the details).
In the proofs of the main results we appeal to Monotonicity to show that, for any n,
a rule rn satisfying some properties (e.g. (11) and (13)) is selected wpp at any state ω
in which all agents in roles other than n chose some a′−n and rn plays bn = Bn(a
′
−n) in
each period (see for example Lemma 14). Thus, the role of Monotonicity in our proofs
is to ensure that for any ω and rn ∈ Rn(ω), ρn(ω)[rn] > 0 if
θ[ω] ∈ Θ−n(a′−n) for some a′−n, and πn(bn, a′−n) ≥ πn(θ[ω]m
′,t′
n , a
′
−n) ∀(m′, t′), (21)
where bn is the action rn takes at every period in state ω. But the knowledge that rn was
the rule that chose bn in each period in ω is not necessary for our selection results. To see
this, fix any ω satisfying (21). Let Θ−n(a′−n | T ) = {θ ∈ Θ | θ
m′,T
−n = a
′
−n for all m
′} be
the set of histories in which all do a′−n in roles other than n in the last period. Suppose
rn(θ̃)[bn] = 1 for all θ̃ ∈ Θ−n(a′−n | T ); thus the behaviour of rn does not depend on the
history of play before the last period if a′−n was played in all matches in the last period.
Then, for any θ̃ ∈ Θ−n(a′−n | T ), both Mn(rn, θ[ω], 1 | θ̃) and MBn (θ[ω], 1) are equal to
{m′ | θ[ω]m′,1n = bn} . Also, for all θ̃ ∈ Θ and t > 1, Mn(rn, θ[ω], t | θ̃) and MBn (θ[ω], t)
40If πn(θ
m,1) ≥ πn(θm
′,t′) for some m and all (m′, t′), then such a condition would require
rn(θ̃)[θ
m,1
n ] > 0 for every (pre-history) θ̃, which is only possible when rn is history-independent.
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are equal to {m′ | θ[ω]m′,tn = bn}, i.e. rn chooses bn at (θ̃t, .., θ̃T , θ[ω]1, .., θ[ω]t−1) for all
t > 1 because θ[ω]m
′,t−1
−n = a
′
−n for all m
′. Hence, rn is s-Justifiable at ω.
It therefore follows from the above that with s-Justifiable selection criterion we have
that at any ω satisfying (21), ρn(ω)[rn] > 0 if rn(θ̃)[bn] = 1 for all θ̃ ∈ Θ−n(a′−n | T ). The
latter restriction is effectively a 1-period recall condition and our analysis could allow
for it. More specifically, all our results, other than Proposition 18, hold if we replace
Monotonicity assumption with s-Justifiable selection criterion because the critical sets
such as RQ and Ra allow for rules that have the following 1-period recall property: for
all n, a′−n and θ̃ ∈ Θ−n(a′−n | T ), the rule does Bn(a′−n) (or Bn(a′−n | Qn )) at θ̃.41
Selection with Birth. Given No-Birth assumption, without mutation the system
may become stuck in state(s) in which all agents adopt the same rule even if the rule
does badly in this state. Although mutation may prevent such an outcome persisting,
it may be argued that even with no mutation new rules may be adopted if incumbent
rules induce non-reasonable outcomes. For example, if the same action a ∈ A occurs
in every match and in all of the last T periods, then agents might assume that a will
be played again in the next period; hence, it may be reasonable to assume that at θ(a)
agents choose B(a). Thus, even if rules that do B(a) at θ(a) are absent in the previous
T periods, we might still expect agents to select such rules at θ(a). The following
formalises this idea.
Assumption (u-Birth): For any ω, n and rn ∈ Rn\Rn(ω), ρn(ω)[rn] > 0 if and only
if θ[ω] = θ(a) for some a ∈ A, rn(θ(a))[Bn(a)] > 0 and r′n(θ(a))[Bn(a)] = 0 for all
r′n ∈ Rn(ω).
If we replace No-Birth by u-Birth assumption then, by Lemma 67 (see Online Ap-
pendix), A(C) contains a MWCURB set, for each C ∈ Γ. This has two implications.
First, with u-Birth indeterminacy results under HIM are more limited as it would be re-
stricted to MWCURB sets; i.e. while Theorem 8 still holds, Theorem 6 no longer holds
if a /∈ E. Second, with u-Birth under HDM we select a MaxMin MWCURB norm:
Proposition 26 Suppose HDM and u-Birth. Assume R ∩ R∗
Q
6= ∅ for some MaxMin
MWCURB norm Q ∈ W . Then u(C) = uW for any C ∈ Γ∗.42
41The result in Proposition 18 regarding the set R+a also holds if Monotonicity assumption is replaced
by Justifiable criterion. However it does not hold with s-Justifiable criterion. This is because to apply
s-Justifiability we need rules that have the 1-period recall property mentioned above, whereas when
T > 1 (as is the case in Proposition 18) rules in the set R+a may not allow for 1-period recall.
42Thus, with u-Birth, our selection of MaxMin MWCURB norm is similar to that in (iii) of Theorem
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For any a ∈ A, u-Birth assumption allows for new rules to emerge at uniform state
ω = (θ(a), R[ω]) only if the existing rules are not best replying to a. We could modify
u-Birth and remove this only if requirement.
Assumption (u*-Birth): For any ω, n and rn ∈ Rn\Rn(ω), ρn(ω)[rn] > 0 if and
only if θ[ω] = θ(a) for some a ∈ A and rn(θ(a′))[Bn(a′)] = 1 for any a′ ∈ A.
If we replace No-Birth by u*-Birth, then by Lemma 68 (see Online Appendix),
A(C) ∈ E for all C ∈ Γ if Ru ∩ Rpure ⊆ R. This has two implications. First, with
u*-Birth and Ru ∩ Rpure ⊆ R, our indeterminacy results under HIM are more limited
as it would be restricted to equilibrium sets, i.e. Theorem 6 and 8 respectively hold
only when a ∈ E and Q ∈ E. Second, with u*-Birth under HDM we select a MaxMin
equilibrium norm:
Proposition 27 Suppose HDM and u*-Birth. Assume Ru∩Rpure ⊆ R and R∩R∗e 6= ∅
for some MaxMin equilibrium norm e ∈ E. Then u(C) = ue for any C ∈ Γ∗.
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7 Appendix: Proof of Lemmas 12, 13 and 14
Unless explicitly stated, all statements below hold independently of the mutation (HDM
or HIM) assumption.
By anonymity of f described in (3), for any C ∈ Γ, h ∈ C × Υ, i and i′ ∈ I, there
exists h′ ∈ C ×Υ such that f(i, h) = f(i′, h′); thus
min
h∈C×Υ
f(i, h) = min
h′∈C×Υ
f(i′, h′) for all C ∈ Γ, i and i′ ∈ I (22)
Given (22), for any C ∈ Γ, define fmin(C) ≡ minh∈C×Υ f(i, h) for all i. Then
res(C,C ′) ≥ fmin(C) for any two distinct C and C ′ ∈ Γ. (23)
Lemma 28 Assume HDM. Fix any C ∈ Γ. For any i ∈ I and h ∈ C×Υ, if πT (i, h) =
u(C) then f(i, h) = fmin(C).
Proof. Suppose not; then πT (i, h) = u(C) and f(i, h) > f(i, h′) for some h′ ∈ C × Υ.
Then by (4), πT (i, h) > πT (i, h′). But this implies u(C) > πT (i, h′); a contradiction.
Lemma 29 Assume HDM. Fix any R′ ⊆ R and C0 ∈ Γ. Suppose R′ is invading. Then
there exists {C1, .., CN} such that, for any n = 1, .., N , (i) Cn ∈ Γ; (ii) Rn(Cn) ∈ R′n,
and R−n(C
n) = R−n(C
n−1); (iii) res(Cn−1, Cn) = fmin(Cn−1) if Rn(C
n−1) /∈ R′n and 0
otherwise; and (iv) γ(Cn) ≤ γ(C0) + fmin(C0)− fmin(Cn).
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Proof. The proof consists of applying the next claim recursively starting from n = 1.
The Induction Claim for any n ≥ 1. Assume that if n > 1 then there exist
{C1, .., Cn−1} such that, for any ` = 1, .., n − 1, C` ∈ Γ; R`(C`) ∈ R′` and R−`(C`) =
R−`(C
`−1); and res(C`−1, C`) = fmin(C`−1) if R`(C
`−1) /∈ R′` and 0 otherwise. Then
there exists Cn ∈ Γ such thatRn(Cn) ∈ R′n andR−n(Cn) = R−n(Cn−1); res(Cn−1, Cn) =
fmin(Cn−1) ifRn(C
n−1) /∈ R′n and 0 otherwise; and γ(Cn) ≤ γ(C0)+fmin(C0)−fmin(Cn).
Proof of the Induction Claim. If Rn(C
n−1) ∈ R′n set Cn = Cn−1; then the claim holds
trivially. So suppose Rn(C
n−1) /∈ R′n. By definition, there exists ωn−1 ∈ Cn−1, i ∈ I and
h ∈ H(ωn−1) such that πT (i, h) = u(Cn−1). Since R′ is invading, there exists rn ∈ R′n
such that one mutation by i at ωn−1 moves the system wpp from ωn−1 to some Cn ∈ Γ
with R(Cn) ∈ (rn, R−n(Cn−1)). Hence, by Lemma 28, res(Cn−1, Cn) = fmin(Cn−1).
Next fix any C0-tree τ ∗C0 ∈ arg minτ∈TC0res(τ) and define the following tree op-
erations on τ ∗C0 : For all ` = 1, .., n such that R`(C
`−1) 6= R`(C`), (i) construct the
edge C`−1 → C` (by the induction assumption and res(Cn−1, Cn) = fmin(Cn−1),
res(C`−1, C`) = fmin(C`−1)) and (ii) delete the edge starting at C` in τ ∗C0 , say C
` → C̃`
(by (23) res(C`, C̃`) ≥ fmin(C`)). The tree operations in (i) and (ii) therefore induce
a Cn-tree τ ∈ TCn such that res(τ) = γ(C0) +
n∑
`=1
res(C`−1, C`) −
n∑
`=1
res(C`, C̃`) ≤
γ(C0) + fmin(C0) − fmin(Cn). The last part of the induction claim then follows from
γ(Cn) ≤ res(τ).
Lemma 30 Fix any C ′ ∈ Γ and Q ⊆ A. Assume R′ is 1-mutation from Q and R(C ′) ∈
R′. Then there exist C ∈ Γ such that A(C) ⊆ Q, R(C) ∈ R′ and γ(C) + fmin(C) ≤
γ(C ′) + fmin(C ′).
Proof. If A(C ′) ⊆ Q then the claim holds trivially (set C = C ′). So suppose A(C ′)  Q
and fix any agent i and any C ′-tree τ ∗C′ ∈ arg minτ∈TC′ res(τ). Denote R(C
′) by r. Since
A(C ′)  Q and R′ is 1-mutation from Q, one mutation by any agent at any ω′ ∈ C ′
moves the system from ω′ to some C ∈ Γ such that A(C) ⊆ Q and R(C) ∈ R′ wpp.
Also, by definition, there exists ω ∈ C ′ and i ∈ I such that i receives u(C ′) at the last
period of ω. Hence, by Lemma 28, res(C ′, C) = fmin(C ′).
Next, define the following tree operations on τ ∗C′ : (i) Construct the edge C
′ → C
and (ii) delete the edge starting at C, say C → C̃. Since res(C ′, C) = fmin(C ′) and, by
(23), res(C, C̃) ≥ fmin(C), the tree operations in (i) and (ii) induce a C-tree τC ∈ TC ,
such that res(τC) = γ(C
′) + res(C ′, C)− res(C, C̃) ≤ γ(C ′) + fmin(C ′)− fmin(C). The
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claim in the lemma then follows from γ(C) ≤ res(τC).
Lemma 31 Fix any C ′ ∈ Γ and i. There exists h ∈ C ′×Υ such that πT (i, h) = u(C ′).
Proof. Given the definition of u(C ′), there exists ω′ ∈ C ′, m ∈ M and n ∈ N such
that πn(θ[ω
′]m,T ) = u(C ′). This implies any h = (ω, {υt(i)}t∈T,i∈I) ∈ H(ω) such that
υT (i) = (m,n) satisfies the claim in the lemma.
Proof of Lemma 12. Suppose not; then u(C0) < u(Q). Fix any C0-tree τ ∗C0 ∈
arg minτ∈TC0 res(τ). Since R
′ is invading, by Lemma 29, there exists CN ∈ Γ such that
γ(CN) ≤ γ(C0) + fmin(C0)− fmin(CN) (24)
and R(CN) ∈ R′. Since R′ is 1-mutation from Q, by Lemma 30, there exists C ∈ Γ such
that A(C) ⊆ Q, R(C) ∈ R′ and γ(C) ≤ γ(CN) + fmin(CN)− fmin(C). Then, by (24),
γ(C) ≤ γ(C0) + fmin(C0)− fmin(C). (25)
By A(C) ⊆ Q, we have u(Q) ≤ u(C); therefore, u(C0) < u(C). Next, fix any i ∈ I.
By Lemma 31, there exists h0 ∈ C0×Υ and h ∈ C×Υ such that πT (i, h0) = u(C0) and
πT (i, h) = u(C). Given u(C0) < u(C) and (4), we then have f(i, h0) < f(i, h). Thus, by
Lemma 28, fmin(C0) = f(i, h0) < f(i, h) = fmin(C). But then, by (25), γ(C) < γ(C0);
this contradicts the supposition that C0 ∈ Γ∗.
Lemma 32 Fix any ω ∈ Ω and t′ ≥ 1. Starting from ω wpp the system reaches ω′ ∈ Ω
such that θ[ω′]m,t = θ[ω]m,T and R[ω′]m,t = R[ω]m,T for all m and t ≥ t′.
The proof of Lemma 32 follows trivially from rule and action inertia.
Henceforth we shall use the term one mutation by an agent at ω to rn in role n of
match m to refer to the situation in which an agent mutates at ω and then chooses rn
after being assigned role n in match m. Also, for any m, n, r′ and rn, denote the profile
of rules in different matches in any period {rm′}m′∈M ∈ R
M
such that rm = (rn, r
′
−n)
and rm
′
= r′ for all m′ 6= m by qn(m, rn | r′).
Lemma 33 Fix any m ∈ M , n ∈ N , rn ∈ Rn, r′ ∈ R and ω ∈ Ω such that R(ω) = r′
and r′n 6= rn. Assume r′(θ[ω])[a′] > 0 and rn(θ[ω])[bn] > 0 for some a′ ∈ A and bn ∈ An.
Then one mutation by any agent i at ω to rn in role n of match m moves the system wpp
from ω to some state ω̂ such that θ[ω̂]T = φ(m, (bn, a
′
−n) | a′), R[ω̂]T = qn(m, rn | r′)
and, for all t < T , θ[ω̂]t = θ[ω]t+1 and R[ω̂]t = R[ω]t+1.
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Proof. Suppose that the system is in state ω at some date τ and the following happens:
(i) agent i is the only agent that is in a mutating status, (ii) agent i is assigned role n
in match m, (iii) other agents are randomly matched to other roles and matches (iv)
agent i mutates to rn and plays bn and every other agent in any role k follows her rule
r′k and plays a
′
k. Then at τ + 1 the state ω̂ satisfying the claim in the lemma will be
reached wpp with one mutation by i.
Lemma 34 Fix any m ∈ M , n ∈ N , rn ∈ Rn, r′ ∈ R and ω ∈ Ω such that R[ω]T =
qn(m, rn | r′). Assume r′(θ[ω])[a′] > 0 and rn(θ[ω])[bn] > 0 for some a′ ∈ A and
bn ∈ An. Fix any bn ∈ {bn, θ[ω]m,Tn } and cm
′
k ∈ {a′k, θ[ω]
m′,T
k } for any k and m′ such
that either k 6= n or m′ 6= m. Then from ω wpp the system reaches state ω̂ such that
θ[ω̂]m,T = (bn, c
m
−n), θ[ω̂]
m′,T = (cm
′
1 , .., c
m′
N ) for all m
′ 6= m, R[ω̂]T = qn(m, rn | r′), and
θ[ω̂]t = θ[ω]t+1 and R[ω̂]t = R[ω]t+1 for all t < T .
Lemma 35 Fix any Q ⊆ A, ω ∈ Ω, r ∈ R such that θ[ω]m,T ∈ Q and R[ω]m,T = r for
all m, and (11) holds. Then from ω wpp the system reaches some C ∈ Γ with A(C) ⊆ Q.
The proof of Lemma 34 is similar to that of Lemma 33, and Lemma 35 follows
trivially from Lemma 32 (see Online Appendix for the proofs of Lemmas 34 and 35).
Lemma 36 Fix any Q ⊆ A, n ∈ N , m ∈ M , a ∈ Q, ω1 ∈ Ω, r ∈ R and sn ∈ Sn such
that θ[ω1]m
′,T
−n = a−n for all m
′, R[ω1]T = qn(m, sn | r), sn(θ′)[an] > 0 for all θ′ ∈ Θ, r
satisfies (11) and there exists bn ∈ Bn(a−n | Q) ∪ an such that
rn(θ[ω
1])[bn] > 0 and rn(θ(m, a | bn, a−n)[bn] > 0. (26)
Then from ω1, the system reaches wpp some C ∈ Γ such that A(C) ⊆ Q and R(C) = r.
Proof. Suppose the system is at ω1 at some date τ . It follows from rn(θ[ω
1])[bn] > 0,
θ[ω1]m
′,T
−n = a−n for all m
′, sn(θ[ω
1])[an] > 0 and Lemma 34, that the system reaches
wpp at date τ + 1 state ω2 ∈ Ω, where θ[ω2]T = φ(m, a | bn, a−n), θ[ω2]t = θ[ω1]t+1 for
all t < T and R[ω2]T = qn(m, sn | r). But then by Lemma 32 the system reaches wpp
at date τ + T state ω3 ∈ Ω, where θ[ω3] = θ(m, a | bn, a−n) and R[ω3]t = qn(m, sn | r)
for all t. By (26), rn(θ[ω
3])[bn] > 0. Also, sn(θ[ω
3])[an] > 0.
Thus, assuming that for the next T periods all agents in role n follow their rules and
agents in roles other than n suffer from action inertia, we have (applying Lemma 34 T
times) that the system reaches wpp at date τ + 2T state ω4 such that θ[ω4] = θ(m, a |
bn, a−n), R[ω
4] = R[ω3]. Since bn = Bn(a−n | Qn) ∪ an, it must be that rn performs
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at least as well as sn in state ω
4. Thus, at date τ + 2T all agents in role n, by the
Monotonicity assumption, will adopt rn wpp.
43 Then, by Lemma 32 the system reaches
wpp some C ∈ Γ such that A(C) ⊆ Q and R(C) = r.
Proof of Lemma 13 . Fix any C ′ ∈ Γ, ω ∈ C ′, r ∈ R′, a′ ∈ A and i ∈ I such
that A(C ′)  Q, R(C ′) = r and r(θ[ω])[a′] > 0. Since r satisfies (11) and A(C ′)  Q,
we have a′ /∈ Q (otherwise, by Lemma 35, A(C ′) ⊆ Q). Fix any n such that a′n /∈ Qn,
an ∈ Qn and sn ∈ Sn such that sn(θ′)[an] > 0 for all θ′ ∈ Θ. There are two cases.
Case A. a′−n ∈ Q−n. By (12b) and a′−n ∈ Q−n, there exists m such that
rn(θ(m, (an, a
′
−n) | a′′n, a′−n))[Bn(a′−n | Q)] > 0 for all a′′n ∈ An. (27)
Also, by r(θ[ω])[a′] > 0, sn(θ[ω])[an] > 0, Lemma 33 and Lemma 32, starting from ω
at some date τ , one mutation by any agent i at ω to sn in role n of match m moves
the system wpp T periods later to some state ω1, where θ[ω1] = θ(m, (an, a
′
−n) | a′)
and R[ω1],t = qn(m, sn | r) for all t. Condition (27) implies that rn(θ[ω1])[bn] > 0 and
rn(θ(m, (an, a
′
−n) | bn, a′−n)[bn] > 0, where bn = Bn(a′−n | Q). So, given that an ∈ Qn
and a′−n ∈ Q−n and r satisfies (11), at ω1 all the assumptions in Lemma 36 hold; hence,
it follows from Lemma 36 that from ω1 the system reaches wpp some C ∈ Γ such that
A(C) ⊆ Q and R(C) = r ∈ R′.
Case B. a′−n /∈ Q−n. By (12a) and a′n /∈ Qn, there existsm′ such that r−n(θ(m′, (an, a′−n) |
a′))[a−n] > 0 for some a−n ∈ Q−n. Also, by r(θ[ω])[a′] > 0, sn(θ[ω])[an] > 0, Lemma
33 and Lemma 32, starting from ω at some date τ , one mutation by any agent i at ω
to sn in role n of match m
′ moves the system wpp to some state ω̂ at date τ + T such
that θ[ω̂] = θ(m′, (an, a
′
−n) | a′) and R[ω̂]t = qn(m′, sn | r) for all t. Also, by (12b) and
a−n ∈ Q−n, there exists m such that
rn(θ(m, a | a′′n, a−n))[Bn(a−n | Q)] > 0 for all a′′n ∈ An. (28)
Then, by r−n(θ(m
′, (an, a
′
−n) | a′))[a−n] > 0, Lemma 34 and Lemma 32, from ω̂ the
system reaches T periods later wpp ω1 ∈ Ω, where θ[ω1] = θ(m, a | a′n, a−n), R[ω1]m,t =
(sn, r−n) and R[ω
1] = R[ω̂]. Thus, by condition (28), rn(θ[ω
1])[bn] > 0 and rn(θ(m, a |
43In this proof we appeal to Monotonicity to select rn and eliminate sn at date τ + 2T in state ω
4
with history θ[ω4] = θ(m′, a | bn, a−n). Given that θ[ω3] is also equal to θ(m′, a | bn, a−n) we could
appeal to Monotonicity and select rn earlier at date τ + T in state ω
3. However, history θ[ω3] at date
τ +T is obtained after rn being subject to action inertia for T −1 periods whereas history θ[ω4] at date
τ + 2T is reached by rn being active (not subject to action inertia) for the previous T periods. Given
that we want to allow for the possibility that Monotonicity applies only after the rules in a particular
role are all active, in the proof we appeal to Monotonicity to select rn at date τ + 2T rather than
earlier.
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bn, a−n)[bn] > 0, where bn = Bn(a−n | Q). So, given that an ∈ Qn and a−n ∈ Q−n and r
satisfies (11), at ω1 all the assumptions in Lemma 36 hold; hence, by Lemma 36, from
ω1 the system reaches wpp some C ∈ Γ such that A(C) ⊆ Q and R(C) = r ∈ R′.
For any ω0, a′−n ∈ A−n, m, n, rn, r′ and τ = 1, 2, .., let Kτ (m,n, rn, r′ | a′−n, ω0) ={b
t
n, c
t
n, ω
t}τt=1
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
for all 1 ≤ t ≤ τ and for all m′ 6= m, rn(θ[ωt−1])[btn] > 0, r′n(θ[ωt−1])[ctn] > 0,
θ[ωt] = (θ[ωt−1]2, .., θ[ωt−1]T , φ(m, (btn, a
′
−n) | ctn, a′−n),
R[ωt]t
′
= R[ωt−1]t
′+1 for all t′ < T , and R[ωt]T = qn(m, rn | r′).

be the set of sequences of actions in role n and states of length τ that can occur after
ω0 assuming that, in each period, all agents in roles other than n play a′−n, the agent
in role n of match m play according to rn and all other agents in role n play according
to r′n. The set K
τ (m,n, rn, r
′ | a′−n, ω0) is non-empty as it can be defined recursively.
Lemma 37 Fix any a ∈ A, ω0 ∈ Ω, a′−n ∈ A−n, m ∈ M , n ∈ N , rn ∈ Rn and r′ ∈ R
such that θ[ω0] ∈ Θ̂−n(m | a′−n)\θ(a), R[ω0]T = qn(m, rn | r′) and
rn(θ)[Bn(a
′
−n)] > 0 for all θ ∈ Θ̂−n(m | a′−n)\θ(a) and rn(θ(a))[Bn(a−n) ∪ an] > 0.
(29)
Then from ω0 the system reaches wpp some C ∈ Γ such that Rn(C) = (rn, r′−n).
Proof. First, we establish the following induction claim.
The Induction Claim for any t ≥ 1. Assume that if t > 1 then there exists
{bt′n , ct
′
n , ω
t′}t−1t′=1 ∈ Kt−1(m,n, rn, r′ | a′−n, ω0) such that bt
′
n = Bn(a
′
−n) for all t
′ < t and
starting from ω0 the system reaches wpp ωt−1. Then there exists {btn, ctn, ωt} such that
btn = Bn(a
′
−n), rn(θ[ω
t−1])[btn] > 0, r
′
n(θ[ω
t−1])[ctn] > 0, θ[ω
t]T = φ(m, (btn, a
′
−n) | ctn, a′−n),
R[ωt]T = qn(m, rn | r′), θ[ωt]t
′
= θ[ωt−1]t
′+1 and R[ωt]t
′
= R[ωt−1]t
′+1 for all t′ < T , and
starting from ωt−1 the system reaches wpp ωt at the next date.
Proof of the Induction Claim. Fix any ctn such that r
′
n(θ[ω
t−1])[ctn] > 0. Then the
proof follows from applying Lemma 34 to ωt−1 if it can be shown that rn(θ[ω
t−1])[Bn(a
′
−n)] >
0. If t = 1 or an = Bn(a−n) then this follows from (29), given that θ[ω
t−1] ∈ Θ̂−n(m |
a′−n) and θ[ω
0] 6= θ(a). If t > 1 and an 6= Bn(a−n) then, given that bt−1n = Bn(a′−n), we
have θ[ωt−1] ∈ Θ̂−n(m | a′−n)\θ(a); but then, by (29), rn(θ[ωt−1])[Bn(a′−n)] > 0.
By applying the claim recursively starting from t = 1, there exists {btn, ctn , ωt}Tt=1 ∈
KT (m,n, rn, r
′ | a′−n, ω0) such that btn = Bn(a′−n) for every t ∈ T and starting from
ω0 the system reaches wpp ωT . Since by definition ωT ∈ Θ̂−n(m | a′−n) and R[ωT ]t =
qn(m, rn | r′) and btn = Bn(a′−n) for all t, rn performs at least as well as r′n at every period
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in ωT . Thus, by Monotonicity, rn will be adopted by all agents in role n wpp at ω
T .44
Hence, by Lemma 32, the system reaches some C ∈ Γ such that Rn(C) = (rn, r′−n).
Lemma 38 Fix any a ∈ A, ω0 ∈ Ω, a′−n ∈ A−n, m ∈ M , n ∈ N , rn ∈ Rn and r′ ∈ R
such that R(ω0) = r′, r′−n(θ[ω
0])[a′−n] > 0 and rn satisfies (29). Then one mutation
by any agent at ω0 to rn in role n of match m moves the system wpp from ω
0 to some
C ∈ Γ such that Rn(C) = (rn, r′−n).
Proof. Fix any {btn, ctn , ωt}Tt=1 ∈KT (m,n, rn, r′ | a′−n, ω0) such that if rn(θ[ω0])([Bn(a′−n)] >
0 then b1n = Bn(a
′
−n). Clearly, K
T (m,n, rn, r
′ | a′−n, ω0) exists. The proof has two steps.
Step 1. One mutation by any agent at ω0 to rn in role n of match m moves the sys-
tem wpp from ω0 to state ωT . To show this note that, by R(ω0) = r′, r′−n(θ[ω
0])[a′−n] >
0, rn(θ[ω
0])[b1n] > 0, r
′
n(θ[ω
0])[c1n] > 0 and Lemma 33, one mutation by any agent at
ω0 to rn in role n of match m moves the system wpp from ω
0 to state ω1. Since
rn(θ[ω
t−1])[btn] > 0 and r
′
n(θ[ω
t−1])[ctn] > 0 for every t > 1, by applying Lemma 34
(T − 1) times, we have that starting from ω1 the system reaches wpp ωT .
Step 2. Starting from ωT the system will reach some C ∈ Γ such that Rn(C) =
(rn, r
′
−n). To show this there are two cases to consider.
Case 1. θ[ωT ] = θ(a): By the definition of ωT , R[ωT ]t = qn(m, rn | r′) for all t. Also,
since θ[ωT ] = θ(a), rn performs at least as well as r
′
n in ω
T . Thus, by Monotonicity, rn
will be adopted by all agents in role n wpp at ωT .45 Hence, by Lemma 32, from ωT the
system reaches wpp T periods later some C ∈ Γ such that Rn(C) = (rn, r′−n).
Case 2. θ[ωT ] ∈ Θ̂−n(m | a′−n)\θ(a): Given that R[ωT ]T = qn(m, rn | r′) and rn
satisfies (29), by Lemma 37, from ωT the system reaches some C ∈ Γ s.t. Rn(C) =
(rn, r
′
−n).
Proof of Lemma 14. Fix any C ′ ∈ Γ, r′ and n ∈ N , such that r′ = R(C ′). If rn = r′n
then rn is invading at C
′. So suppose that r′n 6= rn. Fix any ω ∈ C ′ and a′−n such that
r′−n(θ[ω])[a
′
−n] > 0. If Q ∈ W , then as r satisfies (12b) and (13), there exists m such
that rn(θ)[Bn(a
′
−n)] > 0 for all θ ∈ Θ̂−n(m | a′−n). Also, if Q is singleton and equal to
some a ∈ A, then as r satisfies (11) and (13), rn(θ(a)[an] = 1 and rn(θ)[Bn(a′−n)] > 0
for all θ ∈ Θ̂−n(m | a′−n)\θ(a). Thus, in both cases rn satisfies (29). Hence, by Lemma
44Note that in state ωT all agents in role n are active. Therefore, this result holds if Monotonicity
assumption applied only in roles where agents do not suffer from action inertia.
45Note that in state ωT all agents in role n are active. Therefore, this result holds if Monotonicity
assumption applied only in roles where agents do not suffer from action inertia.
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38, one mutation by any agent at ω to rn in role n of match m moves the system from
ω to some C ∈ Γ satisfying R(C) = (rn, R−n(ω)) wpp. Hence, rn is invading at C ′.
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Online Appendix to “Rules and Mutation - A Theory
of How Efficiency and Rawlsian
Egalitarianism/Symmetry May Emerge”
In this Online Appendix, we complete the remaining discussions and proofs (accord-
ing to the sections) in the paper. All references are to statements in the paper.
1 Section 2 of the Paper: The Case of M = 1
All our results also extend to the case when M = 1. The analysis in this case is
somewhat different; in particular, with rule inertia and No-Birth it is much simpler as
evolutionary forces has effectively no bite on rule selection under these assumptions.
When M = 1, there is exactly one agent in each role and thus I = N . Then at any
state, for any n, whenever one agent mutates to some rule rn ∈ Rn, given rule inertia
assumption, the system reaches a state ω′ in which all agents in role n play rn (i.e.
Rn(ω
′) = rn) wpp. By No-Birth, this means that all agents will use rn henceforth. This
implies that all rules are invading. Therefore, all rule profiles can be adopted with at
most N mutation (one for each role).
The above conclusion implies that, to obtain any of our results under the assumptions
of rule inertia and No-Birth, it suffices for the set of feasible rules to contain rules that
have only 1-mutation from property. For example consider the set of equilibrium rules
REQ = {r ∈ RE | r(θ)[Q] = 1 for all θ ∈ Θ\ ∪e θ(e)} that always does an action in Q at
non-equilibrium histories. Any r ∈ REQ is 1-mutation from Q. To see this, fix any C such
that R(C) = r and A(C)  Q, and any ω ∈ C. Then θ[ω] = θ(e) for some e ∈ E\Q.
Next, fix any m, n, an 6= en and sn such that sn(θ)[an] > 0 for all θ ∈ Θ, and consider a
mutation at ω by any agent to sn in role n of match m. Then from ω the system reaches
some ω′ ∈ Ω such that θ[ω′] = θ(m, (an, e−n) | e) and R[ω′] = qn(m, sn | r). At this
history rn does better than sn and thus, by Monotonicity, wpp sn is eliminated at ω
′
and all choose rn. Furthermore since θ[ω
′] /∈ ∪eθ(e) we have r(θ[ω′])[Q] = 1. Therefore,
all will play an action in Q henceforth.
1
Given that every r ∈ REQ is invading and 1-mutation from Q, it follows that under
HDM if REQ ∩ R is non-empty then the claim in Proposition 15 that u(C) ≥ u(Q) for
all C ∈ Γ∗ holds. The claim in (i) of Theorem 2 then follows by setting Q equal to a
MaxMin norm.
The other selection results under HDM and the results under HIM also extend by
similar type of reasoning.
2 Section 4 and the Appendix in the Paper
2.1 Outstanding Proofs from Section 4 and the Appendix
Proof of Lemma 16. Fix r ∈ Rs and n. Denote the player other than n by k. First,
consider any θ ∈ Θ such that A(θ) ⊆ Q. Then by (1a) and Q ∈ W , rn(θ)[an] > 0 implies
that an = Bn(θ
m′,t′) ∈ Qn for some m′ and t′. Thus, rn satisfies (11). Second, fix any
a′n /∈ Qn, a′k /∈ Qk and an ∈ Qn. By (1b), there exists m such that rk(θ(m, (an, a′k) |
a′))[Bk(an)] > 0. But given that Q ∈ W , Bk(an) ∈ Qk. Hence, r satisfies (12a).
Third, fix any a′k ∈ Qk, a′n ∈ An and an ∈ Qn. By (1b), there exists m such that
rn(θ(m, (an, a
′
k) | a′))[Bn(a′k)] > 0. But given that Q ∈ W , Bn(a′k) ∈ Qn. Hence, r
satisfies (12b). Finally, r trivially satisfies (13) because for any n ∈ N , a′ ∈ A, a′′n ∈ An,
by (1b), rn(θ(m, (a
′′
n, a
′
k) | a′))[Bn(a′k)] > 0 for any m.
For any C ∈ Γ, define Au(C) ≡ {a ∈ A | (θ(a), r) ∈ C}.
Proof of Lemma 17. For all n and a ∈ A, let Fn(a) = B̃n(a)∪an and F (a) = ×nFn(a).
Define recursively the sequence Y 1(a), Y 2(a), .... as follows: Y 1(a) = {a} and, for any
integer k ≥ 1, Y k+1(a) = ∪a′∈Y k(a)F (a′). Let Y (a) = {a′ ∈ A | a′ ∈ Y k(a) for some k}
and Y = ∪a∈Au(C)Y (a).
For all a ∈ Au(C), by R(C)(θ(a))[Bn(a)] > 0 and Lemma 34 (setting r′ = R(C)),
F (a) ⊆ Au(C). Hence, by recursion for every a ∈ Au(C) and k ≥ 1 we have Y k+1(a) ⊆
Au(C). This implies that Y ⊆ Au(C).
Next we show Y is a WCURB: Fix any a ∈ B̃(Y ). Then there exists a1 ∈ Y such
that a ∈ B̃(a1); thus, a ∈ Y 2(a1). But by a1 ∈ Y ⊆ Au(C) we have Y 2(a1) ⊆ Y . Hence
a ∈ Y . Therefore, Y is a WCURB set. But this together with Y ⊆ Au(C) implies that
there exists Q ∈ W such that Q ⊆ A(C). Since R(C)(θ(a))[B(a)] > 0 for all a ∈ A,
this implies that u(C) ≤ u(Q) ≤ uW .
Lemma 39 Suppose T > 1. Fix any a. Every r ∈ R+a is 1-mutation from a.
2
Proof. Fix any i ∈ I, C ′ ∈ Γ, ω ∈ C ′, r ∈ R+a and a′ such that R(C ′) = r, A(C ′) 6= a
and r(θ[ω])[a′] > 0. Clearly, a′ 6= a; otherwise, by Lemma (35), A(C ′) = a. Let n be
such that a′n 6= an. There are two cases.
Case A: a′−n 6= a−n. Fix any m. Suppose the system is at ω at some date τ and
agent i mutates, is assigned role n in match m and mutation is to some sn ∈ Sn such
that sn(θ)[an] > 0 for all θ ∈ Θ. Then by Lemmas 33 and 32 the system reaches wpp
at date τ + T state ω̂, where θ[ω̂] = θ(m, (an, a
′
−n) | a′), R[ω̂]t = qn(m, sn | r) for all t.
Since a′n 6= an and a′−n 6= a−n, by (15a), r−n(θ[ω̂])[a−n] > 0. Thus, by Lemma 34, the
system reaches at date τ + T + 1 wpp state ω1 with θ[ω1]T = φ(m, (an, a−n) | a′n, a−n),
θ[ω1]t = θ[ω̂]t+1 for all t < T and R[ω1] = R[ω̂]. Since T > 1, a′n 6= an and a′−n 6= a−n,
we have θ[ω1] ∈ Θ\{Θs ∪ Θ−}. By (15b), this implies rn(θ[ω1])[an] > 0. Also, by
(8), rn(θ(a))[an] > 0. Since sn(θ
′)[an] > 0 for all θ
′ ∈ Θ, we have that at ω1 all the
assumptions in Lemma 36 hold for the case in which Q = a and bn = an; hence, it then
follows from that lemma that starting at state ω1 the system reaches wpp some C ∈ Γ
such that A(C) = a and R(C) = r ∈ R′.
Case B: a′−n = a−n. Fix any k 6= n. Since a′−k 6= a−k, by (10), there exists m such
that rk(θ
′)[Bk(a
′
−k)] > 0, for all θ
′ ∈ Θ̂−k(m | a′−k). Suppose the system is at ω and
agent i mutates, is assigned role k of match m and mutation is to sk ∈ Sk such that,
for some a′′k 6= Bk(a′−k), sk(θ′)] [a′′k] > 0 for all θ′ ∈ Θ. Then, by Lemmas 33 and 32, the
system reaches wpp some ω′ ∈ Ω with θ[ω′] = θ(m, (a′′k, a′−k) | a′), R[ω′]t = qk(m, sk | r)
for all t. Since rk(θ
′)][Bk(a
′
−k)] > 0, for all θ
′ ∈ Θ̂−k(m | a′−k), by applying Lemma 34 T
times, starting from ω′ the system reaches wpp some ω̂ ∈ Ω with θ[ω̂] = θ(m, (a′′k, a′−k) |
Bk(a
′
−k), a
′
−k), R[ω̂]
t = qk(m, sk | r) for all t. Given that πk(Bk(a′−k), a′−k) > πk(a′′k, a′−k),
rk performs better than sk in state ω̂ and next date all agents in role k will adopt rk wpp.
Since θ[ω̂] ∈ Θ̂−k(m | a′−k), rk(θ[ω̂])[Bk(a′−k)] > 0; furthermore, since a′′k 6= Bk(a′−k) and
(15a) holds, rn(θ[ω̂])[an] > 0. Hence, by Lemma 34, starting from ω̂ next date the system
reaches wpp some ω̃ ∈ Ω with θ[ω̃]T = φ(m, (an, Bk(a′−k), a′−n,k) | a′n, Bk(a′−k), a′−n,k),
θ[ω̃]T−1 = φ(m, (a′n, a
′′
k, a
′
−n,k) | a′n, Bk(a−k), a′−n,k) and θ[ω̃]t = θ[ω̂]t+1 for t < T − 1,
R[ω̃]T = r and R[ω̃]t = R[ω̂]t+1 for all t < T . Since an 6= a′n and a′′k 6= Bk(a′−k), by (15b),
r(θ[ω̃])[a] > 0. Hence, starting from from ω̃ next date the system reaches wpp some ω̃′
with θ[ω̃′]T = φ(a), θ[ω̃′]t = θ[ω̃]t+1 for t < T , R[ω̃′]T = r and R[ω̃′]t = R[ω̃]t+1 for all
t < T . Hence, by Lemma (35), the system reaches wpp some C such that A(C) = a
3
and R(C) = r.
Lemma 40 Fix any a. Any R′ ∈ Ra is 1-mutation from a and invading if R′ ⊆ R.
Proof. Fix any R′ ∈ Ra such that R′ ⊆ R. Since for every r ∈ R′, (8) and (9) hold, by
Lemma 13, R′ is 1-mutation from a.
Next, fix any n ∈ N , C ′ ∈ Γ and r′ such that r′ = R(C ′). If r′n ∈ R′n then R′n is
invading at C ′. So assume r′n /∈ R′n. Fix any ω ∈ C ′ and a′−n such that r′−n(θ[ω])[a′−n] >
0. Let bn = Bn(a
′
−n). Given the definition of Ra in (18), there exists rn ∈ R′n and
m such that rn(θ)[bn] = 1 for all θ ∈ Θ̂−n(m | a′)\θ(a); but then by Lemma 38 and
bn = Bn(a
′
−n), one mutation by any agent at ω to rn in role n of match m moves
the system from ω to some C ∈ Γ satisfying R(C) = (rn, R−n(C ′)) wpp. Thus, R′n is
invading at C ′.
Lemma 41 Assume HIM. Suppose R′ ⊆ R is w-invading. For any C0 ∈ Γ, there exists
a sequence {C1, .., CN} such that, for any n = 1, .., N , (i) Cn ∈ Γ; (ii) Rn(Cn) ∈ R′n
and R−n(C
n) = R−n(C
n−1); and (iii) res(Cn−1, Cn) = η if Cn−1 6= Cn and 0, otherwise.
Proof. The proof consists of applying the next claim recursively starting from n = 1.
The Induction Claim for any n ≥ 1. Assume if n > 1 then there exists {C1, .., Cn−1}
such that, for any ` = 1, .., n−1, (i) C` ∈ Γ, (ii) R`(C`) ∈ R′` and R−`(C`) = R−`(C`−1),
and (iii) res(C`−1, C`) = η if R`(C
`−1) /∈ R′` and 0, otherwise. Then there exists
Cn ∈ Γ such that Rn(Cn) ∈ R′n and R−n(Cn) = R−n(Cn−1), and res(Cn−1, Cn) = η if
Rn(C
n−1) /∈ R′n and 0, otherwise.
Proof of the claim. There are two possibilities. If Rn(C
n−1) ∈ R′n then the claim
follows by setting Cn = Cn−1. If Rn(C
n−1) /∈ R′n, then the claim holds because, given
that R′n is w-invading at C
n−1, there exists rn ∈ R′n, i ∈ I and ω ∈ Cn−1 such that
one mutation by i at ω moves the system wpp from ω to some Cn ∈ Γ satisfying
R(Cn) = (rn, R−n(C
n−1)).
Proof of Lemma 21. Fix any C0 ∈ Γ∗ and any C0-tree τ ∗C0 ∈ arg minτ∈TC0 res(τ).
By assumption R′ ⊆ R is 1-mutation from Q and w-invading. The latter implies that
there exists a sequence {C1, .., CN} that satisfies, for any n = 1, .., N , the claims (i) -(iii)
in Lemma 41. But then there must exists CN+1 ∈ Γ such that (a) A(CN+1) ⊆ Q and
R(CN+1) ∈ R′ and (b) res(CN , CN+1) = η if CN 6= CN+1 and 0, otherwise (if A(CN)  
Q this follows from R(CN) ∈ R′ and R′ being 1-mutation from Q, and if A(CN) ⊆ Q
then set CN+1 = CN).
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Next, perform the following tree operations on τ ∗C0 : For any n = 1, .., N + 1 such
that Cn−1 6= Cn, (i) construct the edge Cn−1 → Cn (by the previous argument
res(Cn−1, Cn) = η) and (ii) delete the edge starting at Cn, say Cn → C̃n (clearly,
res(Cn, C̃n) ≥ η).
The tree operations (i) and (ii) induce a CN+1-tree without increasing the total
resistance; hence γ(CN+1) ≤ γ(C0). But since C0 ∈ Γ∗ we have CN+1 ∈ Γ∗; this
together with A(CN+1) ⊆ Q and R(CN+1) ∈ R′ completes the proof.
Lemma 42 Fix any C ∈ Γ, ω ∈ C, r ∈ R and a ∈ A such that ρ(ω)[r] > 0 and
r(θ[ω])[a] > 0. Then there exists ω′ ∈ C such that θ[ω′] = θ(a) and R(ω′) = r.
Proof. Suppose at ω all agents revise their rule to r and choose a. Since this can
happen wpp, there exists ω̂ ∈ C such that θ[ω̂]m,T = a and R[ω̂]m,T = r for all m. The
claim in the lemma then follows from Lemma 32.
Proof of Lemma 34. Suppose that the system is in state ω at some date τ and the
following happens: (i) all agents are assigned the same roles and the same matches as
at date τ − 1, (ii) all agents are subject to rule inertia, (iii) the agent in role n of match
m plays bn (this is feasible because if bn = bn then the agent follows her rule rn and
plays bn and if bn = θ[ω]
m,T
n then the agent suffers action inertia and plays θ[ω]
m,T
n ) and
(iv) every other agent in any role k in any match m′ plays cm
′
k (this is feasible because
if cm
′
k = a
′
k then the agent follows her rule r
′
k and plays a
′
k and if c
m′
k = θ[ω]
m′,T
k then
the agent suffers action inertia and plays θ[ω]m
′,T
k ). Then at τ + 1 state ω̂ satisfying the
properties claimed in the lemma will be reached wpp.
Proof of Lemma 35. Starting from ω, by Lemma 32, the system eventually reaches
wpp a state ω′ ∈ Ω such that θ[ω′]m,t = θ[ω]m,T ∈ Q and R[ω′]m,t = r for all m and t.
The claim then follows from (11).
2.2 An Alternative Approach to Demonstrating Selection of
MaxMin Norm with Match-Neutral Rules
In Proposition 15, we established the claim that under HDM, for any a ∈ A, u(C) ≥ u(a)
for all C ∈ Γ∗ if R ∩ Ra 6= ∅ (with the inequality binding when a is a MaxMin norm).
The set of pure rules belonging to Ra, however, are not match-neutral if a /∈ E. In the
paper, we stated that there are different ways of extending the same claim to match-
neutral rules. One alternative to Ra is R
+
a ; we showed that the latter contains pure
match-neutral rules and that, for the case of T > 1, u(C) ≥ u(a) for all C ∈ Γ∗ if
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R ∩ R+a 6= ∅. Here, we consider an alternative approach to constructing match-neutral
rules that establish the same claim (without restricting the analysis to T > 1).
Fix any a. Consider the following alternative to (10):
∀n, a′−n and θ ∈ ∪mΘ̂−n(m | a′−n), (a) rn(θ)[Bn(a′−n)] > 0 if θ /∈ ∪a′nθ(m, a | a
′
n, a−n)
and (b) rn(θ)[Bn(a−n) ∪ an] > 0, otherwise. (30)
For any m, n, a′−n and θ ∈ Θ̂−n(m | a′−n), (30) requires playing wpp a best reply if
θ /∈ ∪a′nθ(m, a | a′n, a−n) and either a best response or an, otherwise.
We shall refer to the set of rules that satisfy a-constrained (8), a-triggering (9), and
(30) by R∗a and call elements of this set a-star rules. We will consider a-star rules that
satisfy one of the following conditions:
if an 6= Bn(a−n) then rn(θ)[an] = 0 ∀θ ∈ Θs\Θ(a) (31)
or
if an 6= Bn(a−n) then rn(θ)[an] = 0 ∀θ ∈ Θ\{Θs ∪Θ−}, (32)
where Θ(a) = ∪m′,k,a′θ(m′, (ak, a′−k) | a′) is the set of stationary 1-deviation histories
from a. Conditions (31) and (32) require that whenever an is not a best reply to a−n,
either (i) an is played at a stationary history θ only if θ ∈ Θ(a) or (ii) an is played at a
non-stationary history θ only if θ ∈ Θ− respectively. Denote the set of a-star rules that
satisfy (31) by R∗a(1) and the set of a-star rules that satisfy (32) by R
∗
a(2).
Note the following points. First, (30) implies that rn(θ(a
′))[Bn(a
′
−n)] > 0 for all
a′ 6= a; hence, R∗a(j) ∩ R
pure ⊂ RE for any j = 1, 2. Second, R∗a(j) is non-empty for
any j = 1, 2: Clearly, (30), (31) and (32) are well defined, and are consistent with each
other; furthermore, they are also are consistent with (8) and (9) because (30), (31) and
(32) allow for the possibility of playing an at every stationary 1-deviation histories Θ(a).
Third, R∗a(j) contains pure rules that are match-neutral for any j = 1, 2. An example
of such a rule is the following: in any role n, play (i) an at every stationary 1-deviation
history θ ∈ {∪m,a′nθ(m, a | a′n, a−n)}∪{∪m,k 6=n,a′k 6=ak θ(m, (ak, a
′
−k) | a′)}, (ii) Bn(a′−n) at
every 1-deviation history θ ∈ ∪m,a′nΘ̂−n(m | a′−n)\θ(m, a | a′n, a−n) for all a′−n and (iii)
Bn(a−n) at every other history. Fourth, when an = Bn(a), (31) and (32) are trivially
satisfied; hence, if a ∈ E then R∗a = R∗a(1) = R∗a(2).
We next demonstrate the claim that, for every C ∈ Γ∗, u(C) is bounded below by
u(a) if a-star rules are feasible.
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Proposition 43 Assume HDM. Fix any a ∈ A. Suppose either (a) M > 2 and R ∩
R∗a(1) 6= ∅ or (b) T > 1 and R ∩R∗a(2) 6= ∅. Then u(C) ≥ u(a) for any C ∈ Γ∗.1
Since Proposition 43 holds for any a and, for any j = 1, 2, R∗a(j) ∩ R
pure
is a non-
empty subset of RE and includes match-neutral rules, it follows that if either M > 2 or
T > 1 then there exists a match-neutral r ∈ RE ∩ Rpure such that if r is feasible then
u(C) = u(a) for any C ∈ Γ∗. Thus, Part (i) of Theorem 2 holds even if R is restricted
to match-neutral ones as long as either M > 2 or T > 1.
Our results for 2-complexity rules also extends to match-neutral rules. For this we
weaken (17) to: for all n
rn(θ)[bn] = 1 if θ ∈ ∪m,a′Θ̂−n(m | a′−n)\θ(m, a | a′n, a−n) (33)
and require (8), (9) and either (31) or (32):2 Let
R∗a(1) =
R′ ⊂ S2
∣∣∣∣∣∣ ∀r ∈ R
′ satisfies (8), (9) and
∀b ∈ A, ∃ r ∈ R′ that satisfies (33) and (31) ∀n
 (34)
R∗a(2) =
R′ ⊂ S2
∣∣∣∣∣∣ ∀r ∈ R
′ satisfies (8), (9) and
∀b ∈ A, ∃ r ∈ R′ that satisfies (33) and (32) ∀n
 (35)
Clearly, R∗a(j) is non-empty and includes pure match-neutral rules for all j = 1, 2. We
can now state our result for match-neutral 2-complexity rules.
Proposition 44 Assume HDM. Fix any a ∈ A. Suppose there exists R′ ⊆ R such that
either (a) M > 2 and R′ ∈ R∗a(1) or (b) T > 1 and R′ ∈ R∗a(2). Then u(C) ≥ u(a) for
every C ∈ Γ∗.
Proposition 44 when a is a MaxMin norm demonstrates that if either M > 2 or
T > 1 then part (ii) of Theorem 2 holds even if R is restricted to match-neutral ones.
Proof of Propositions 43 and 44
In the rest of this subsection a ∈ A is fixed throughout. Also, for any m ∈ M and
ω ∈ Ω, we use the term m-agent of ω to denote any agent that plays in match m in
the last period of ω. Next, we introduce the concept of payoff invading (henceforth,
p-invading) rules.
1Note that the above results excludes the possibility of T = 1 and M = 2. In this case we conjecture
that a similar result may not be possible as there may not be enough leeway to construct a pure match-
neutral rule that is both 1-mutation from a and has appropriate invading property.
2Condition (33) is similar to (30a) except that the latter requires playing a best response at such
histories whereas (33) requires playing a fixed action bn at all such histories.
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Definition 45 (i) Any R′n ⊆ Rn for role n is p-invading at C ′ ∈ Γ if, whenever R′n ∩
Rn(C
′) = ∅, for any ω ∈ C ′ and m ∈ M such that u(θ[ω]m,T ) = u(C ′), there exists
rn ∈ R′n such that one mutation by any m-agent of ω at ω moves the system wpp from
ω to some C ∈ Γ with R(C) ∈ (rn, R−n(C ′)).
(ii) Any R′ ⊆ R is p-invading at v ∈ R if R′n is p-invading at all C ′ ∈ Γ such that
u(C ′) ≤ v, for all n.
Lemma 46 Fix any C ′ ∈ Γ and r′ ∈ R such that R(C ′) = r′. There exists ω ∈ C ′,
m ∈ M , d ∈ A and a′′ ∈ A such that θ[ω] = θ(m, a′′ | d), u(ω) = u(a′′) = u(C ′) and
either d 6= a or r′(θ[ω])[a] = 1. If in addition u(C ′) < u(a) then a′′ 6= a.
Proof. Given the definition of u(C ′), there exists a′′ ∈ A(C ′) and ω′ ∈ C ′ such that
u(a′′) = u(C ′) and θ[ω′]m,T = a′′ for some m. Fix any d ∈ A such that r′(θ[ω′])[d] > 0.
By Lemmas 34 (setting rn = r
′
n) and 32, starting from ω
′ wpp the system reaches ω
such that θ[ω] = θ(m, a′′ | d) and R(ω) = r′. Clearly, u(ω) = u(a′′) = u(C ′) and ω ∈ C ′.
This implies the first claim in the lemma if r′(θ[ω])[a] = 1. So suppose otherwise; then
exists d′ 6= a such that r′(θ[ω])[d′] > 0. But then, by Lemmas 34 (setting rn = r′n) and
32, starting from ω wpp the system reaches state ω̂ such that θ[ω̂] = θ(m, a′′ | d′). But
then the first claim in the lemma must also hold in this case as ω̂ ∈ C ′ and d′ 6= a.
If u(C ′) < u(a) then, by u(C ′) = u(a′′), we also have a′′ 6= a.
Lemma 47 Fix any R′ ⊆ R and C0 ∈ Γ∗. Suppose R′ is p-invading at u(C0). Then
there exists {C1, .., CN} such that, for any n = 1, .., N , (i) Cn ∈ Γ; (ii) Rn(Cn) ∈ R′n,
and R−n(C
n) = R−n(C
n−1)); (iii) res(Cn−1, Cn) = fmin(Cn−1) if Rn(C
n−1) 6= Rn(Cn)
and 0, otherwise; (iv) γ(Cn) ≤ γ(C0) + fmin(C0)− fmin(Cn); and (v) u(C0) ≥ u(Cn).
Proof. The proof consists of applying the following claim recursively starting from
n = 1.
The Induction Claim for any n ≥ 1. Assume that if n > 1 then there exist
{C1, .., Cn−1} such that, for any ` = 1, .., n − 1: C` ∈ Γ; R`(C`) ∈ R′` and R−`(C`) =
R−`(C
`−1)); res(C`−1, C`) = fmin(C`−1) if R`(C
`−1) /∈ R′` and 0, otherwise; and u(C0) ≥
u(C`). Then there exists Cn ∈ Γ such that Rn(Cn) ∈ R′n and R−n(Cn) = R−n(Cn−1));
res(Cn−1, Cn) = fmin(Cn−1) if Rn(C
n−1) /∈ R′n and 0, otherwise; γ(Cn) ≤ γ(C0) +
fmin(C0)− fmin(Cn); and u(C0) ≥ u(Cn).
Proof of the Induction Claim. Since u(C0) ≥ u(C`) for ` = 1, .., n−1, the assumption
that R′ is p-invading at u(C0) implies that R′n is p-invading at C
n−1. If Rn(C
n−1) ∈ R′n
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set Cn = Cn−1; then the claim holds trivially. So suppose Rn(C
n−1) /∈ R′n. By the
definition of u(Cn−1), there exists ωn−1 ∈ Cn−1 and m such that u(θ[ωn−1]m,T ) =
u(Cn−1). Since R′ is p-invading at Cn−1, there exists rn ∈ R′n such that one mutation
by any m-agent of ωn−1 at ωn−1 to rn moves the system wpp from ω
n−1 to some Cn ∈ Γ
with R(Cn) ∈ (rn, R−n(Cn−1)). Given that one such m-agent of ωn−1 receives u(Cn−1)
at the last period of ωn−1, by Lemma 28, res(Cn−1, Cn) = fmin(Cn−1). Furthermore,
by the same reasoning as in the proof of The Induction Claim in the proof of Lemma
29 γ(Cn) ≤ γ(C0) + fmin(C0) − fmin(Cn). Finally, we need to show u(C0) ≥ u(Cn).
To establish this, suppose otherwise. Fix any i ∈ I. Then, by Lemma 31, there exists
h0 ∈ C0×Υ and hn ∈ Cn×Υ such that πT (i, h0) = u(C0) < u(Cn) = πT (i, hn). Hence,
by (4), f(i, h0) < f(i, hn) and, by Lemma 28, fmin(C0) = f(i, h0) < f(i, hn) = fmin(Cn).
This, together with γ(Cn) ≤ γ(C0) + fmin(C0) − fmin(Cn), implies γ(Cn) < γ(C0),
thereby contradicting C0 ∈ Γ∗.
Lemma 48 Fix any C0 ∈ Γ∗. Suppose there exists R′ ⊆ R such that R′ is p-invading
at u(C0) and 1-mutation from a. Then u(C0) ≥ u(a).
Proof. Suppose not; then u(C0) < u(a). Fix any C0-tree τ ∗C0 ∈ arg minτ∈TC0 res(τ).
Since R′ is p-invading at u(C0), by Lemma 47, there exists CN ∈ Γ such that
γ(CN) ≤ γ(C0) + fmin(C0)− fmin(CN) (36)
and R(CN) ∈ R′. Since R′ is 1-mutation from a, by Lemma 30, there exists C ∈ Γ such
that A(C) = a, R(C) ∈ R′ and γ(C) ≤ γ(CN) + fmin(CN)− fmin(C). But then by (36)
we have
γ(C) ≤ γ(C0) + fmin(C0)− fmin(C). (37)
Since A(C) = a, we have u(C0) < u(C). Fix any i. Then, by Lemma 31, there exists h0 ∈
H(C0) and h ∈ H(C) such that πT (i, h0) = u(C0) and πT (i, h) = u(C). Given u(C0) <
u(C) and (4), we have f(i, h0) < f(i, h). Thus, by Lemma 28 we have fmin(C0) =
f(i, h0) < f(i, h) = fmin(C). But then, by (37), γ(C) < γ(C0); this contradicts the
supposition that C0 ∈ Γ∗.
Lemma 49 Fix any ω0 ∈ Ω, a′−n ∈ A−n, m ∈ M , n ∈ N , rn ∈ Rn and r′ ∈ R
such that θ[ω0] ∈ Θ̂−n(m | a′−n)\ ∪m′,a′n θ(m′, a | a′n, a−n), rn(θ′)[Bn(a′−n)] > 0 for all
θ′ ∈ Θ̂−n(m | a′−n)\ ∪m′,a′n θ(m′, a | a′n, a−n) and R[ω0]T = qn(m, rn | r′). Then from ω0
the system reaches some C ∈ Γ such that Rn(C) = (rn, r′−n).
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Proof. First, we establish the following claim.
Claim A. There exists some τ ∈ T and {btn, ctn , ωt}τt=1 ∈ Kτ (m,n, rn, r′ | a′−n, ω0)
such that θ[ωτ ]m,tn = Bn(a
′
−n) for every t ∈ T and starting from ω0 the system reaches
wpp state ωτ .
We prove this claim by recursion in two steps.
Step 1. There exists {b1n, c1n , ω1} ∈ K1(m,n, rn, r′ | a′−n, ω0) such that b1n = Bn(a′−n)
and starting from ω0 the system reaches wpp state ω1.
By assumption, r(θ[ω0])[Bn(a
′
−n)] > 0. Hence, the claim in this step follows from
Lemma 34.
Step2. Fix any 0 < t < T . If there exists {bt′n , ct
′
n , ω
t′}tt′=1 ∈ Kt(m,n, rn, r′ | a′−n, ω0)
such that btn = Bn(a
′
−n) 6= θ[ωt]m,t
′
n for some t
′ < T , then there exists {bt+1n , ct+1n , ωt+1} ∈
K1(m,n, rn, r
′ | a′−n, ωt) such that bt+1n = Bn(a′−n) and starting from ωt the system
reaches wpp ωt+1.
Since btn = Bn(a
′
−n) 6= θ[ωt]m,t
′
n for some t
′ < T , it follows that θ[ωt] ∈ Θ̂−n(m |
a′−n)\ ∪m′,a′n θ(m′, a | a′n, a−n). But then by assumption rn(θ[ωt])[Bn(a′−n)] > 0. Then
the claim in this step follows from Lemma 34.
The statement in Claim A follows from Step 1 if T = 1 or θ[ω0]m,tn = Bn(a
′
−n) for
every t > 1 (in these case τ = 1); otherwise, it follows from Step 1 and by applying
Step 2 recursively.
By Claim A, θ[ωτ ]m,tn = Bn(a
′
−n) for every t ∈ T . Hence, at every period in state ωτ ,
rn performs at least as well as rule r
′
n. Thus, by Monotonicity, rn will be adopted by all
agents in role n wpp at ωτ .3 Hence, by Lemma 32, the system will reach some C ∈ Γ
such that Rn(C) = (rn, r
′
−n).
Lemma 50 Fix any ω0 ∈ Ω, a′−n ∈ A−n, m ∈M , n ∈ N , rn ∈ Rn and r′ ∈ R such that
θ[ω0] = θ(m, a′′ | d) for some a′′ and d ∈ A, r′−n(θ[ω0])[a′−n] > 0 and rn satisfies (30).
Suppose if rn(θ)[Bn(a−n)] = 0 for some θ ∈ ∪m′,a′n 6=anθ(m′, a | a′n, a−n) then one of the
following holds: (i) r′−n(θ[ω
0])[a−n] = 0, (ii) r
′
n(θ[ω
0])[an] = 1, (iii) rn(θ[ω
0])[an] = 0,
(iv) θ[ω0] ∈ ∪cn 6=anθ(cn, a−n) or (v) a′′ 6= a, d 6= a and (32) holds. Assume also that
either (a) R[ω0] = r′ and there is one mutation by any agent at ω0 to rn in role n of
match m or (b) R[ω0]T = qn(m, rn | r′). Then starting from ω0 the system reaches
some C ∈ Γ such that Rn(C) = (rn, r′−n) wpp.
3Note that in state ωτ all agents in role n are active. Therefore, this result holds if Monotonicity
assumption applied only in roles where agents do not suffer from action inertia.
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Proof. Fix any {btn, ctn , ωt}Tt=1 ∈KT (m,n, rn, r′ | a′−n, ω0) such that if rn(θ[ω0])([Bn(a′−n)] >
0 then b1n = Bn(a
′
−n). Given the definition of K
T (m,n, rn, r
′ | a′−n, ω0), such a sequence
exists. Furthermore, under the assumptions of the lemma the system reaches ωT from
ω0 wpp (when (a) in the lemma holds this follows from applying Lemma 33 followed
by Lemma 34 T − 1 times, and when (b) in the lemma holds this follows from applying
Lemma 34 T times). Now if
πn(b
t′
n , a
′
−n) ≥ πn(ct
′′
n , a
′
−n) for all t
′ and t′′ ∈ T (38)
then rn performs at least as well as r
′
n in every period of ω
T ; hence, by Monotonicity,
wpp rn will be adopted by all agents in role n in the next period, and thus the claim
follows from Lemma 32. So suppose otherwise. To complete the proof of the lemma it
is then sufficient to show the following:
from ωT the system reaches some C ∈ Γ s.t. Rn(C) = (rn, r′−n). (39)
Since (38) does not hold, it follows from the definition of ωT that θ[ωT ] ∈ Θ̂−n(m |
a′−n)\θ(a) and R[ωT ]t = qn(m, rn | r′) for all t. Then, given that rn satisfies (30), by
Lemmas 37 and 49, (39) holds if either rn(θ
′)[Bn(a−n)] > 0 for all θ
′ ∈ ∪m′,a′nθ(m′, a |
a′n, a−n)\θ(a) or θ[ωT ] /∈ ∪m′,a′nθ(m′, a | a′n, a−n). So assume that neither of these
two conditions hold. Then, by assumption, an 6= Bn(a−n), θ[ωT ] ∈ ∪m′,a′n 6=anθ(m′, a |
a′n, a−n) and one of the conditions (i)-(v) in the lemma holds.
Next we show that θ[ωT ] /∈ ∪a′n 6=anθ(m, a | a′n, a−n). Suppose not; then a′−n = a−n,
ctn 6= an and btn = an for all t ∈ T . But these contradict (i)-(iii) in the lemma. So
either (iv) or (v) must hold. If the former holds then θ[ω0] ∈ Θ̂−n(m | a−n)\ ∪m′,a′n
θ(m′, a | a′n, a−n) and thus, by construction of b1n, b1n = Bn(a−n); but this contradicts
b1n = an 6= Bn(a−n). So assume (v) holds. Then a′′ 6= a and d 6= a; this together with
b1n = an 6= Bn(a−n) implies that θ[ω0]
m′,T
−n 6= a−n for some m′. Since we also have
assumed θ[ωT ] ∈ θ(m, a | a′n, a−n) for some a′n 6= an, it follows that θ[ω1]
m′,T
−n = a−n;
but then given that rn satisfies (32), we have rn(θ[ω
1])[an] = 0. But this contradicts
b2n = an.
Given the above, to complete the proof we only need to consider the case in which
M = 2 and θ[ωT ] = θ(m′, a | a′n, a−n) for some a′n 6= an and m′ 6= m. This means
btn = a
′
n for all t ∈ T and therefore, given that we have assumed (38) is not the case, it
must also be that a′n 6= Bn(a−n). Also, since θ[ωT ] = θ(m′, a | a′n, a−n), by (30), there
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exists bT+1n ∈ {an∪Bn(a−n)} such that rn(θ[ωT ])[bT+1n ] > 0. Therefore, bT+1n 6= btn for all
t ≤ T . Next, fix any cT+1n such that r′n(θ[ωT ])[cT+1n ] > 0 and consider the two different
possibilities.
Case A. Either cT+1n 6= an or T > 1. For any j ∈ {0, 1}, by Lemma 34, starting
from ωT the system reaches wpp state ω(j) ∈ Ω such that θ[ω(j)]T = φ(m, (bT+jn , a−n) |
cT+1n , a−n)), θ[ω(j)]
t = θ[ωT ]t+1 for all t < T and R[ω(j)] = R[ωT ]. If cT+1n 6= an then,
by bTn = a
′
n 6= an, θ[ω(0)] ∈ Θ̂−n(m | a−n)\ ∪m′,d′n θ(m′, a | d′n, a−n) and if T > 1 then,
by bT+1n 6= bTn , θ[ω(1)] ∈ Θ̂−n(m | a−n)\ ∪m′,d′n θ(m′, a | d′n, a−n). Since starting from ωT
the system reaches wpp both ω(0) and ω(1), by Lemma 49 in both cases the system
reaches some C ∈ Γ s.t. Rn(C) = (rn, r′−n) from ωT . Hence, we have (39).
Case B. cT+1n = an and T = 1. By Lemma 34, starting from ω
T the system reaches
wpp ω̂ such that θ[ω̂] = φ(m, (bT+1, a−n) | (cT+1n , a−n)) and R[ω̂] = R[ωT ]. Given that
bT+1n ∈ {an ∪ Bn(a−n)}, πn(bT+1n , a−n) ≥ πn(cT+1n , a−n). Hence, rn performs at least as
well as rule r′n. Thus, by Monotonicity, wpp rn will be adopted by all agents in role n
and Lemma 32 the system reaches some C ∈ Γ such that Rn(C) = (rn, r′−n) from ω̂.
Hence, we have (39).
Lemma 51 Fix any m ∈ M , n ∈ N , rn ∈ Rn, r′ ∈ R and ω ∈ Ω such that R(ω) = r′
and r′n 6= rn. Assume r′(θ[ω])[a′] > 0 and rn(θ[ω])[bn] > 0 for some a′ ∈ A and bn ∈ An.
Fix any cm
′
k ∈ {a′k, θ
m′,T
k } for any k 6= n and m′ 6= m. Then one mutation by any m-
agent of ω at ω to rn in role n of match m moves the system wpp from ω to some state
ω̂ such that θ[ω̂]t = θ[ω]t+1 for all t < T , θ[ω̂]m,T = (bn, a
′
−n) and θ[ω̂]
m′,T = (a′n, c
m′
−n)
for all m′ 6= m, R[ω̂]T = qn(m, rn | r′) and R[ω̂]m
′′,t = r′ for all (m′′, t) 6= (m,T ).
Proof. Suppose that the system is in state ω at some date τ and consider any agent i
that plays in match m in the last period of ω. Next assume that at τ (i) i is the only
agent that is in a mutating status, (ii) i is assigned role n in match m (iii) every agent
other than i that played in match m at date τ − 1 is randomly assigned a role other
than n in match m, (iv) all other agents are assigned the same matches and the same
roles as at date τ − 1, (v) agent i mutates to rn and plays bn and all other agents in
match m follow their rule r′−n and play a
′
−n, and (vi) in any match m
′ 6= m, the agent
in role n follow her rule r′n and plays a
′
n and, for all k 6= n, the agent in role k plays cm
′
k
(this is feasible because if cm
′
k = a
′
k then the agent follows his rule r
′
k and plays a
′
k and
if cm
′
k = θ
m′,T
k then the agent suffers action inertia and plays θ
m′,T
k ). Hence, at τ + 1 the
state ω̂ satisfying the claim in the lemma will be reached.
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Lemma 52 Fix any ω0 ∈ Ω, a′−n ∈ A−n, m ∈M , n ∈ N , rn ∈ Rn and r′ ∈ R such that
θ[ω0] = θ(m, a′′ | d) for some a′′ 6= a and d ∈ A, R[ω0] = r′ and r′−n(θ[ω0])[a′−n] > 0.
Assume either d 6= a or r′(θ[ω0])[a] = 1. Suppose rn satisfies
rn(θ)[Bn(a
′
−n)] = 1 for all θ ∈ ∪m,a′nΘ̂
−n(m | a′−n)\θ(m, a | a′n, a−n), (40)
and either (a) M > 2 and (31) or (b) T > 1 and (32). Then one mutation by any
m-agent of ω0 at ω0 to rn in role n of match m moves the system from ω
0 wpp to some
C ∈ Γ such that Rn(C) = (rn, r′−n).
Proof. The claim in the lemma follows from Lemma 50 if either rn(θ)[Bn(a−n)] > 0 for
all θ ∈ ∪m′,a′n 6=anθ(m′, a | a′n, a−n) or any of the conditions (i)-(v) in Lemma 50 holds.
So assume otherwise; then an 6= Bn(a) (this follows from (30)), r′−n(θ[ω0])[a−n] > 0,
r′n(θ[ω
0])[c1n] > 0 for some c
1
n 6= an, rn(θ[ω0])[an] > 0, either d 6= a′′ or d = a′′ with
d` 6= a` for some ` 6= n and (v) in Lemma 50 does not hold. But by assumption
r′n(θ[ω
0])[c1n] > 0 for some c
1
n 6= an implies that d 6= a. Since either M > 2 and (31) or
T > 1 and (32), it then follows from a′′ 6= a, d 6= a and (v) in Lemma 50 not holding
that M > 2 and rn(θ)[an] = 0 for all θ ∈ Θs\Θ(a).
Next we show that there exists ` 6= n such that d` 6= a`. Suppose not; then it must be
that d 6= a′′. Since an 6= Bn(a), rn(θ[ω0])[an] > 0, θ[ω0] ∈ Θs, M > 2 and rn(θ)[an] = 0
for all θ ∈ Θs\Θ(a), it must then be that θ(m, a′′ | d) = θ(m, (ak, d−k) | d) for some
k such that dk 6= ak. If k 6= n then the claim follows. If k = n then a′′ = (an, d−n).
But given that a′′ 6= a, it then follows that there exists ` 6= n such that d` 6= a`; a
contradiction.
Since rn(θ[ω
0])[an] > 0, r
′
n(θ[ω
0])[c1n] > 0, r
′
−n(θ[ω
0])[a−n] > 0 and θ[ω
0]m
′,T
` = d` for
all m′ 6= m, by applying Lemma 51 once and Lemma 32 T − 1 times, one mutation by
any m-agent of ω0 at ω0 to rn in role n of match m moves the system wpp from ω
0 to
state ω̃ such that θ[ω̃] = θ(m, a | (c1n, d`, a−n,`)), Rt[ω̃] = qn(m, rn | r′) for all t. Since
c1n 6= an and d` 6= a`, θ[ω̃] ∈ Θs\Θ(a); therefore rn(θ[ω̃])[an] = 0. The claim in the
lemma then holds because, by Lemma 50 (see (iii) and (b) in Lemma 50), from ω̃ the
system reaches some C ∈ Γ such that Rn(C) = (rn, r′−n) wpp.
Lemma 53 Fix any r ∈ R∗a and v < u(a). Then r is p-invading at v if either M > 2
and (31) or T > 1 and (32)
Proof. Fix any n ∈ N , C ′ ∈ Γ and r′ such that r′ = R(C ′) and u(C ′) ≤ v. If rn = r′n
then rn is p-invading at C
′. So suppose that r′n 6= rn. Since u(C ′) ≤ v < u(a), by Lemma
13
46, there exists ω ∈ C ′, m ∈ M , d ∈ A and a′′ 6= a such that θ[ω] = (θ(m, a′′ | d),
u(C ′) = u(a′′) = u(ω) and either d 6= a or r′(θ[ω])[a] = 1. Let a′−n be such that
r′−n(θ[ω])[a
′
−n] > 0. Then, given that r satisfies (30) and either M > 2 and (31) or
T > 1 and (32) for all n , it follows from Lemma 52 that one mutation by any m-agent
of ω at ω to rn in role n of match m moves the system from ω to some C ∈ Γ satisfying
R(C) = (rn, R−n(ω)) wpp. Thus, rn is p-invading at C
′.
Proof of Proposition 43. Suppose not; then there exists C ′ ∈ Γ∗ such that u(C ′) <
u(a). By assumption and Lemma 53, there exist r ∈ R∩R∗a that is p-invading at u(C ′).
Also, given that r satisfies (11) and (12) for the case when Q = a, by Lemma 13 (setting
R′ = r), r is 1-mutation from a. Thus, it follows from Lemma 48 (by setting R′ to equal
r) that u(C ′) ≥ u(a); but this is a contradiction.
Lemma 54 Fix any R′ ⊆ R such that either (a) M > 2 and R′ ∈ R∗a(1) or (b) T > 1
and R′ ∈ R∗a(2). Assume v < u(a). Then R′ is p-invading at v.
Proof. Fix any n ∈ N , C ′ ∈ Γ and r′ such that r′ = R(C ′) and u(C ′) ≤ v. If r′n ∈ R′n
then R′n is p-invading at C
′. So assume r′n /∈ R′n. Since u(C ′) ≤ v < u(a), by Lemma
46, there exists ω ∈ C ′, m ∈ M , d ∈ A and a′′ 6= a such that θ[ω] = (θ(m, a′′ | d),
u(C ′) = u(a′′) = u(ω) and either d 6= a or r′(θ[ω])[a] = 1.
Next, fix any a′−n such that r
′
−n(θ[ω])[a
′
−n] > 0. By assumption there exists rn ∈ R′n
that satisfies (40) and and either M > 2 and (31) or T > 1 and (32) for all n. But
then, given that r′−n(θ[ω])[a
′
−n] > 0, it follows from Lemma 52 that one mutation by
any m-agent of ω at ω to rn in role n of match m moves the system from ω to some
C ∈ Γ satisfying R(C) = (rn, R−n(ω)) wpp. Therefore, rn is p-invading at C ′.
Proof of Proposition 44. Suppose not; then there exists C ′ ∈ Γ∗ such that u(C ′) <
u(a). By assumption and Lemma 54, there exists R′ ⊆ R such that R′ ∈ R∗a(j) for
some j and R′ is p-invading at u(C ′). Also, since for every r ∈ R′, (8) and (9) hold, by
Lemma 13 R′ is 1-mutation from a. Then it follows from Lemma 48 that u(C ′) ≥ u(a);
but this is a contradiction.
3 Section 5 of the Paper
3.1 Proof of the Claims with No Inertia
First we introduce a concept of invasion based on last period actions.
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Definition 55 (i) Any R′n ⊆ Rn for role n is T-invading at C ′ ∈ Γ if, whenever
R′n ∩ Rn(C ′) = ∅ , there exists a′ ∈ A(C ′), ω ∈ C ′ and rn ∈ R′n such that θ[ω]T = φ(a′)
and u(a′) = u(ω) = u(C ′), and one mutation by any agent at ω to rn moves the system
wpp from ω to some C ∈ Γ with R(C) ∈ (rn, R−n(C ′)).
(ii) Any R′ ⊆ R is T-invading at v ∈ R if R′n is T-invading at all C ′ ∈ Γ such that
u(C ′) ≤ v, for all n.
Lemma 56 For any C ∈ Γ, R(C) is unique and for any a′ ∈ A(C) there exists ω′ such
that θ[ω′]T = φ(a′). Also, if R(C) ∈ Rpure then, for each ω ∈ C, θ[ω]t ∈ ∪a′∈Aφ(a′) for
all t.
Proof. Fix any ω ∈ C. Let r ∈ R(ω) such that ρ(ω)[r] > 0. Then starting from ω the
system moves next date wpp to some ω′ such that R[ω′]m,T = r for all m. By (19) after
T − 1 periods the system reaches wpp some state ω′′ such that R[ω′′]m,t = r for all m
and t. By No-Birth assumption it follows that R(C) = r and thus R(C) is unique.
Next, fix any a′ ∈ A(C). As agents are not subject to action inertia, it must be
that there exists ω′′ ∈ C such that R(C)(ω′′)[a′] > 0. Then starting from ω′′ the system
moves next date wpp to some ω′ such that θ[ω′]T = φ(a′).
Finally, the last claim in the lemma follows trivially from R(C) being unique.
Lemma 57 Fix any R′ ⊆ R and C0 ∈ Γ∗. Suppose R′ is T-invading at u(C0). Then
there exists {C1, .., CN} such that, for any n = 1, .., N , (i) Cn ∈ Γ; (ii) Rn(Cn) ∈ R′n,
and R−n(C
n) = R−n(C
n−1)); (iii) res(Cn−1, Cn) = fmin(Cn−1) if Rn(C
n−1) 6= Rn(Cn)
and 0, otherwise; (iv) γ(Cn) ≤ γ(C0) + fmin(C0)− fmin(Cn); and (v) u(C0) ≥ u(Cn).
Proof. The proof consists of applying the following claim recursively starting from
n = 1.
The Induction Claim for any n ≥ 1. Assume that if n > 1 then there exist
{C1, .., Cn−1} such that, for any ` = 1, .., n − 1: C` ∈ Γ; R`(C`) ∈ R′` and R−`(C`) =
R−`(C
`−1)); res(C`−1, C`) = fmin(C`−1) if R`(C
`−1) /∈ R′` and 0, otherwise; and u(C0) ≥
u(C`). Then there exists Cn ∈ Γ such that Rn(Cn) ∈ R′n and R−n(Cn) = R−n(Cn−1));
res(Cn−1, Cn) = fmin(Cn−1) if Rn(C
n−1) /∈ R′n and 0, otherwise; γ(Cn) ≤ γ(C0) +
fmin(C0)− fmin(Cn); and u(C0) ≥ u(Cn).
Proof of the Induction Claim. Since u(C0) ≥ u(C`) for ` = 1, .., n−1, the assumption
that R′ is T-invading at u(C0) implies that R′n is T-invading at C
n−1. If Rn(C
n−1) ∈ R′n
set Cn = Cn−1; then the claim holds trivially. So suppose Rn(C
n−1) /∈ R′n. By the
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definition of u(Cn−1), there exists an−1 ∈ A(Cn−1), ωn−1 ∈ Cn−1 and rn ∈ R′n such
that θ[ωn−1]T = φ(an−1) and u(an−1) = u(ωn−1) = u(Cn−1), and one mutation by any
agent at ωn−1 to rn moves the system wpp from ω
n−1 to some Cn ∈ Γ with R(Cn) ∈
(rn, R−n(C
n−1)). Given that there exists at least one agent who receives u(Cn−1) at
the last period of ωn−1, by Lemma 28, res(Cn−1, Cn) = fmin(Cn−1). Furthermore, by
the same reasoning as in the proof of The Induction Claim in the proof of Lemma 47,
γ(Cn) ≤ γ(C0) + fmin(C0)− fmin(Cn) and u(C0) ≥ u(Cn).
Lemma 58 Fix any C0 ∈ Γ∗. Suppose there exists R′ ⊆ R such that R′ is T-invading
at u(C0) and 1-mutation from a. Then u(C0) ≥ u(a).
Proof. Suppose not; then u(C0) < u(a). Fix any C0-tree τ ∗C0 ∈ arg minτ∈TC0 res(τ).
Since R′ is T-invading at u(C0), by Lemma 57, there exists CN ∈ Γ such that γ(CN) ≤
γ(C0)+fmin(C0)−fmin(CN) and R(CN) ∈ R′. The rest of the proof is identical to that
in Lemma 48.
Next we show that for any a, R′ ∈ R̃a is both invading and T-invading at any
v < u(a) and 1-mutation from a.
Lemma 59 Fix any a, R′ ⊆ R and v < u(a). Suppose R′ ∈ R̃a. Then R′ is both
w-invading and T-invading at v.
Proof. Fix any n ∈ N , C ′ ∈ Γ and r′ such that r′ = R(C ′). If r′n ∈ R′n then R′n is
both w-invading and T-invading at C ′. So assume r′n /∈ R′n. Next, we establishing two
claims.
Claim 1. Assume A(C ′) = a. Then R′n is w-invading at C
′.
Since A(C ′) = a, C ′ is singleton and equal to some ω such that θ[ω] = θ(a) and
r′(θ[ω])[a] = 1. Fix any rn ∈ R′n. By (20a), rn(θ[ω])[an] = 1. By Lemma 33, one
mutation by any agent at ω to rn in role n of match m moves the system wpp from ω to
some state ω′ such that θ[ω′]m
′′,T = a for all m′′, R[ω′]m,T = (rn, r
′
−n) and R[ω
′]m
′,t = r′
for all (m′, t) 6= (m,T ). As rn performs equally well as r′n does at the last period of ω′,
by Monotonicity assumption (19), wpp rn will be chosen by all agents in role n for the
next period. Applying (19) for T − 1 more periods, the system reaches wpp some state
ω′′ such that R[ω′′]m
′,t = (rn, r
′
−n) for all m
′ and t. This establishes the claim.
Claim 2. Suppose there exists ω ∈ C ′ and a′′ 6= a such that θ[ω]T = φ(a′′). Then
one mutation by any agent at ω to rn moves the system wpp from ω to some C ∈ Γ
with R(C) ∈ (rn, R−n(C ′)).
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Fix any a′ such that r′(θ[ω])[a′] > 0. Let bn = Bn(a
′
−n). As R
′ ∈ R̃a, by (20b),
θ[ω]T = φ(a′′) and a′′ 6= a, there exists rn ∈ R′n such that rn(θ[ω])[bn] = 1. Therefore,
by Lemma 33, one mutation by any agent at ω to rn in role n of match m moves the
system wpp from ω to some state ω′ such that θ[ω′]m,T = (bn, a
′
−n), θ[ω
′]m
′,T = a′ for
all m′ 6= m, θ[ω′]t = θ[ω]t+1 for all t < T , R[ω′]m,T = (rn, r′−n) and R[ω′]m
′,t = r′ for all
(m′, t) 6= (m,T ). As bn = Bn(a′−n), by Monotonicity assumption (19), wpp rn will be
chosen by all agents in role n for the next period. Applying (19) for T − 1 more periods
the system reaches wpp some state ω′′ such that R[ω′′]m
′,t = (rn, r
′
−n) for all m
′ and for
all t. This establishes the claim.
Now if A(C ′) 6= a, by Lemma 56, there exists ω ∈ C ′ and a′′ 6= a such that θ[ω]T =
φ(a′′). So it follows by Claims 1 and 2 that Rn is w-invading at C
′. Furthermore, if
u(C ′) ≤ v then by v < u(a) we have A(C ′) 6= a. So, by Claim 2, Rn is T-invading at C ′
if u(C ′) ≤ v.
Lemma 60 Fix any a ∈ A, R′ ∈ R̃a such that R′ ⊆ R. Then R′ is 1-mutation from a.
Proof. Fix any i ∈ I, C ′ ∈ Γ, ω ∈ C ′, and r ∈ R′ such that A(C ′) 6= a and
R(C ′) = r. Since r ∈ R′ ⊆ Rpure, by Lemma 56, there exists a′′ ∈ A(C ′) such that
θ[ω]T = φ(a′′). Let a′ ∈ A be such that r(θ[ω])[a′] = 1. Next note that a′n 6= an for
some n. Otherwise, r(θ[ω])[a] = 1 and, by (20a), a will be chosen by all agents for
all the following periods; but this implies C ′ = (θ(a), r), contradicting the assumption
that A(C ′) 6= a. Furthermore, since R′ ∈ R̃a and θ[ω]T = φ(a′′), by (20), there exists
r′n ∈ R′n such that r′n(θ[ω])[an] = 1.
Next, suppose at date τ the system is at state ω. Fix any m. By Lemma 33, one
mutation by any agent at ω to r′n in role n of match m moves the system wpp from
ω to some state ω′ such that θ[ω′]T = φ(m, (an, a
′
−n) | a′), R[ω′]m,T = (r′n, r−n) and
R[ω′]m
′,t = r for all (m′, t) 6= (m,T ). Now, by (20a), r′n(θ[ω′])[an] = 1 and r(θ[ω′])[a] =
1. Given that ρn(ω)[rn, r
′
n] = 1, it then follows that wpp the system reaches a state ω
′′
such that θ[ω′′]T = φ(a), R[ω′′]m
′,T ∈ {r, (r′n, r−n)} ⊂ R′ for all m′. Then by applying
(20a) and (19) for the next T − 1 periods, the system reaches wpp a recurrent class
A(C) = a and R(C) ∈ {r, (r′n, r−n)} and we establish the claim in the lemma.
Proof of Proposition 23 . Suppose there exists R′ ⊆ R such that R′ ∈ R̃a. Then,
by Lemmas 59 and 60, R′ is w-invading, T-invading at v < u(a) and 1-mutation from
a. Then (i) under HDM, by Lemma 58, that u(C) ≥ u(a) for every C ∈ Γ∗ and (ii)
under HIM, by Lemma 21, there exists C ∈ Γ∗ such that A(C) = a.
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3.2 Proof of the Claims When Monotonicity and Observability
of Rules Are Relaxed
In this subsection we shall demonstrate how the selection result in Proposition 15 and
the indeterminacy result in Proposition 22, both regarding RQ, can be extended when
Monotonicity selection criterion is replaced by s-Justifiable criterion. The other results
with the sets Ra and R∗a (for the case when M > 2) also extend by similar type of
reasoning.
Fix any Q ⊆ A. We first modify the Q-triggering property in (12) by
∀n and a′−n ∈ A−n, ∃ m s.t. for all an ∈ Qn, a′n ∈ An and θ s.t. θT = φ(m, (an, a′−n) | a′)
(a) r−n(θ)[Q−n] > 0, if a
′
−n /∈ Q−n and a′n /∈ Qn and (41)
(b) rn(θ)[Bn(a
′
−n | Q)] = 1, if a′−n ∈ Q−n.
Condition (41) is the same restriction as (12) except that, for any n and a′−n ∈ A−n,
the latter is a restriction at all stationary θ ∈ ∪an∈Qn,a′n∈Anθ(m, (an, a′−n) | a′) whereas
the former applies at all θ such that θT ∈ ∪an∈Qn,a′n∈Anφ(m, (an, a′−n) | a′). Next, we
modify the Q-star best property in (13) by
∀n and a′−n ∈ A−n, ∃ m′ s.t. rn(θ)[Bn(a′−n)] = 1, ∀θ ∈ Θ̂−n(m′ | a′−n;T )\Θu(Q;T ),
(42)
where, with some abuse of notation, Θu(Q;T ) =
{
θ ∈ Θ
∣∣θT ∈ ∪a∈Qφ(a)} and Θ̂−n(m′ |
a′−n;T ) =
{
θ ∈ Θ
∣∣θT ∈ ∪a′n,a′′n∈Anφ(m′, (a′′n, a′−n) | a′n, a′−n)}. Condition (42) is the same
as (13) except that, for any n and a′−n ∈ A−n, the latter is a restriction at all stationary
θ ∈ Θ̂−n(m′ | a′−n)\Θu(Q) whereas the former applies at all θ such that θ ∈ Θ̂−n(m′ |
a′−n;T )\Θu(Q;T ). Now define the sets RTQ as follows.
RTQ =
{
r ∈ R |r satisfies conditions (11), (41) and (42)
}
.
Note that if Q ∈ W then r ∈ RTQ if and only if it satisfies (11), (41a) and
∀n and a′−n ∈ A−n, ∃ m′ s.t. rn(θ)[Bn(a′−n)] = 1, ∀θ ∈ Θ̂−n(m′ | a′−n;T ). (43)
(this is because when Q ∈ W (43) is equivalent to (42) and (41b)).
The analogue of Propositions 15 for the set RTQ with s-Justifiable selection criterion
is the following.
Proposition 61 Assume HDM and rule selection criterion ρ(.) is s-Justifiable. Fix
any Q such that either Q ∈ W or Q is singleton and suppose R ∩ RTQ 6= ∅. Then
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u(C) ≥ u(Q) for any C ∈ Γ∗.
Proof of Proposition 61
Given Lemma 12, the proof of Proposition 61 involves showing that any r ∈ R∩RTQ
is 1-mutation from Q and invading when Q ∈ W or Q is singleton. In the Appendix
to the paper, we showed that every r′ ∈ R ∩ RQ satisfies these properties if selection
selection criteria is Monotonic. Here, we use a similar reasoning to show that with
s-Justifiable selection criterion the same holds for any r ∈ R ∩RTQ.
For the rest of this subsection, assume rule selection criterion ρ(.) is s-Justifiable.
To show that any r ∈ R∩RTQ is 1-mutation from Q we need to first derive an analogue
of Lemma 36 with s-Justifiable criterion.
Lemma 62 Fix any Q ⊆ A, n ∈ N , m ∈ M , a ∈ Q, ω̃ ∈ Ω, r ∈ R and sn ∈ Sn such
that θ[ω̃]m
′,T
−n = a−n for all m
′, R[ω̃]T = qn(m, sn | r), sn(θ′)[an] > 0 for all θ′ ∈ Θ, r
satisfies (11) and
rn(θ)[bn] = 1, ∀θ s.t. θT ∈ ∪a′′n∈Anφ(m, a | a
′′
n, a−n). (44)
where bn = Bn(a−n | Q). Then from ω̃, the system reaches wpp some C ∈ Γ such that
A(C) ⊆ Q and R(C) = r.
Proof. Fix any a′n such that rn(θ[ω̃])[a
′
n] > 0. Since θ[ω̃]
m′,T
−n = a−n for all m
′, and
sn(θ[ω̃])[an] > 0, by Lemma 34, starting at state ω̃ the system reaches next date wpp
state ω0 ∈ Ω, where θ[ω0]T = φ(m, a | a′n, a−n), R[ω0]T = qn(m, sn | r), θ[ω0]t = θ[ω̃]t+1
and R[ω0]t = R[ω̃]t+1 for all t < T . As θ[ω0]m
′,T
−n = a−n for all m
′, sn(θ
′)[an] > 0 for
all θ′ ∈ Θ and (44) holds, it follows from applying Lemma 34 T times that starting at
ω0 the system reaches T periods later state ωT ∈ Ω, where θ[ωT ] = θ(m, a | bn, a−n)
and R[ωT ]t = qn(m, sn | r) for all t. Since bn = Bn(a−n | Qn), an ∈ Qn, θ[ωT ] =
θ(m, a | bn, a−n) and rn satisfies (44), we have Mn(rn, θ[ωT ], 1 | θ̃) = MBn (θ[ωT ], 1) for
any pre-history θ̃ ∈ Θ such that θ̃T ∈ ∪a′′n∈Anφ(m, a | a′′n, a−n) and Mn(rn, θ[ωT ], t | θ̃′) =
MBn (θ[ω
T ], t) for any θ̃′ ∈ Θ and t > 1. Hence, rn is s-Justifiable. As ρ(.) is s-Justifiable,
the next period all agents in role n will adopt rn wpp. Then, by (11) and Lemma 32,
the system reaches wpp a recurrent class C such that A(C) ⊆ Q and R(C) = r.
Lemma 63 Fix any R′ ⊆ R and Q ⊆ A. Suppose every r ∈ R′ satisfies (11), (41).
Then R′ is 1-mutation from Q.
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Proof. The proof of this lemma is identical to that of Lemma 13 except that here we
appeal to Lemma 62 instead of Lemma 36.
To show that any r ∈ R∩RTQ is invading, we need to first derive analogue of Lemmas
37 and 38 with s-Justifiable criterion.
Lemma 64 Fix any a ∈ A, ω0 ∈ Ω, a′−n ∈ A−n, m ∈ M , n ∈ N , rn ∈ Rn and r′ ∈ R
such that θ[ω0] ∈ Θ̂−n(m | a′−n), R[ω0]T = qn(m, rn | r′) and the following holds
rn(θ)[Bn(a
′
−n)] = 1 ∀θ ∈ Θ̂−n(m | a′−n;T )\Θu(a;T ) and (45)
either rn(θ)[Bn(a
′
−n)] = 1 ∀θ ∈ Θu(a;T ) or rn(θ)[an] = 1 ∀θ ∈ Θu(a;T ).
Suppose also that either θ[ω0] /∈ Θu(a;T ) or rn(θ)[Bn(a′−n)] = 1 for all θ ∈ Θu(a;T ).
Then starting from from ω0 the system reaches some C ∈ Γ such that R(C) = (rn, r′−n).
Proof. There are two steps to this proof.
Step 1. There exists {btn, ctn , ωt}Tt=1 ∈ KT (m,n, rn, r′ | a′−n, ω0) such that btn =
Bn(a
′
−n) for every t ∈ T and starting from ω0 the system reaches wpp ωT : The proof
of this step consists of applying the following claim recursively starting from t = 1.
The Induction Claim for any t ≥ 1. Assume that if t > 1 then there exists
{bt′n , ct
′
n , ω
t′}t−1t′=1 ∈ Kt−1(m,n, rn, r′ | a′−n, ω0) such that bt
′
n = Bn(a
′
−n) for all t
′ < t and
starting from ω0 the system reaches wpp ωt−1. Then there exists {btn, ctn, ωt} such that
btn = Bn(a
′
−n), rn(θ[ω
t−1])[btn] = 1, r
′
n(θ[ω
t−1])[ctn] > 0, θ[ω
t]T = φ(m, (btn, a
′
−n) | ctn, a′−n),
R[ωt]T = qn(m, rn | r′), θ[ωt]t
′
= θ[ωt−1]t
′+1 and R[ωt]t
′
= R[ωt−1]t
′+1 for all t′ < T , and
starting from ωt−1 the system reaches wpp ωt at the next date.
Proof of the Induction Claim. Fix any ctn such that r
′
n(θ[ω
t−1])[ctn] > 0. Then the
proof follows from applying Lemma 34 to ωt−1 if it can be shown that rn(θ[ω
t−1])[Bn(a
′
−n)] =
1. If t = 1 or an = Bn(a−n) then this follows from θ[ω
t−1] ∈ Θ̂−n(m | a′−n), (45) and
that either θ[ω0] /∈ Θu(a;T ) or rn(θ)[Bn(a′−n)] = 1 for all θ ∈ Θu(a;T ). If t > 1 and
an 6= Bn(a−n) then, given that by the induction assumption bt−1n = Bn(a′−n), we have
θ[ωt−1] ∈ Θ̂−n(m | a′−n)\Θu(a;T ); but then, by (45), rn(θ[ωt])[Bn(a′−n)] = 1.
Step 2. Starting from ωT the system reaches wpp some C ∈ Γ such that Rn(C) =
(rn, r
′
−n): First, given that {btn, ctn , ωt}Tt=1 ∈ KT (m,n, rn, r′ | a′−n, ω0), we have θ[ωT ] ∈
Θ̂−n(m | a′−n) and R[ωT ]T = qn(m, rn | r′). Second, it must be that
rn(θ)[Bn(a
′
−n)] = 1 for all θ ∈ Θ s.t. θT ∈ ∪1≤t<T θ[ωT ]t (46)
To show this consider two cases. If an = Bn(a
′
−n) then by (45) rn(θ)[Bn(a
′
−n)] = 1 ∀θ ∈
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Θ̂−n(m | a′−n;T ); but then (46) follows from θ[ωT ] ∈ Θ̂−n(m | a′−n). If an 6= Bn(a′−n)
then θ[ωT ]t 6= φ(a) for every t ∈ T ; but then (46) follows from θ[ωT ] ∈ Θ̂−n(m | a′−n)
and (45).
Now given that by the previous step btn = Bn(a
′
−n) for all t, it follows from (46) that
Mn(rn, θ[ω
T ], 1 | θ̃) = MBn (θ[ωT ], 1) for all θ̃ such that θ̃T ∈ ∪1≤t′<T θ[ωT ]t
′
and, that
Mn(rn, θ[ω
T ], t′ | θ̃) = MBn (θ[ωT ], t′) for all t′ > 1 and θ̃ ∈ Θ. Thus, rn is s-Justifiable.
As ρ(.) is s-Justifiable, at state ωT all agents in role n will adopt rn wpp. Hence, by
Lemma 32, the system reaches some C ∈ Γ such that Rn(C) = (rn, r′−n).
Lemma 65 Fix any a ∈ A, ω0 ∈ Ω, a′−n ∈ A−n, m ∈ M , n ∈ N , rn ∈ Rn and r′ ∈ R
such that R[ω0] = r′, r′−n(θ[ω
0])[a′−n] > 0 and rn satisfies (45). Then one mutation by
any agent at ω0 to rn in role n of match m moves the system wpp from ω
0 to some
C ∈ Γ such that Rn(C) = (rn, r′−n).
Proof. Fix any {btn, ctn , ωt}Tt=1 ∈ KT (m,n, rn, r′ | a′−n, ω0). Given the definition of
KT (m,n, rn, r
′ | a′−n, ω0), such a sequence exists. The rest of the proof follows from the
following two steps.
Step 1. One mutation by any agent at ω0 to rn in role n of match m moves the
system wpp from ω0 to state ωT . This step is identical to Step 1 in the proof of Lemma
38; it follows by exactly the same reasoning.
Step 2. Starting from ωT the system will reach some C ∈ Γ such that Rn(C) =
(rn, r
′
−n). Given the definition of ω
T , we have θ[ωT ] ∈ Θ̂−n(m | a′−n) and R[ωT ]t =
qn(m, rn | r′) for all t. There are two cases.
Case 1. θ[ωT ] ∈ Θu(a;T ), Bn(a′−n) 6= an and rn(θ)[an] = 1 for all θ ∈ Θu(a;T ).
First we show that in this case θ[ωT ] = θ(a). Suppose not; then there exists t ∈ T
such that θ[ωt−1] /∈ Θu(a;T ) and θ[ωt]T = φ(a). But θ[ωt−1] /∈ Θu(a;T ), together with
θ[ωt−1] ∈ Θ̂−n(m | a′−n;T ) and (45), imply that rn(θ[ωt−1])([Bn(a′−n)] = 1; but this,
together with Bn(a
′
−n) 6= an, contradict θ[ωt]T = φ(a).
It then follows from θ[ωT ] = θ(a) and (45) that rn(θ)[an] = 1 for all θ ∈ Θu(a;T ).
Hence, Mn(rn, θ(a), 1 | θ̃) = MBn (θ(a), 1) for all θ̃ ∈ Θu(a;T ) and that Mn(rn, θ(a), t′ |
θ̃) = MBn (θ(a), t
′) for all t′ > 1 and θ̃ ∈ Θ. Thus, given that θ[ωT ] = θ(a), rn is s-
Justifiable at ωT . As ρ(.) is s-Justifiable, at state ωT all agents in role n will adopt rn
wpp. So, by Lemma 32, the system reaches some C ∈ Γ such that Rn(C) = (rn, r′−n).
Case 2. θ[ωT ] /∈ Θu(a;T ) or rn(θ)[Bn(a′−n)] = 1 for all θ ∈ Θu(a;T ). Since θ[ωT ] ∈
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Θ̂−n(m | a′−n), R[ωT ]T = qn(m, rn | r′), and rn satisfies (45), it follows from Lemmas 64
that starting from ωT the system reaches some C ∈ Γ s.t. Rn(C) = (rn, r′−n).
Lemma 66 Fix any Q and r ∈ R ∩ RTQ. Then r is invading if either Q ∈ W or Q is
singleton.
Proof. Fix any C ′ ∈ Γ, r′ and n ∈ N , such that r′ = R(C ′). If rn = r′n then rn is
invading at C ′. So suppose that r′n 6= rn. By Lemma 46, there exists ω ∈ C ′ such that
θ[ω] ∈ Θs and u(C ′) = u(ω). Fix any a′−n such that r−n(θ[ω])[a′−n] > 0. There are two
cases.
Case 1. Q ∈ W . Then as r satisfies (43), there exists m such that rn(θ)[Bn(a′−n)] = 1
for all θ ∈ Θ̂−n(m | a′−n;T ).
Case 2. Q is singleton and equal to some a ∈ A. Then as r satisfies (41b) and (42),
we have rn(θ)[an] = 1 for all θ ∈ Θu(a;T ) and rn(θ)[Bn(a′−n)] = 1 for all θ ∈ Θ̂−n(m |
a′−n;T )\Θu(a;T ).
Thus, in both cases rn satisfies (45). Hence, by Lemma 65, one mutation by any
agent at ω to rn in role n of match m moves the system from ω to some C ∈ Γ satisfying
R(C) = (rn, R−n(ω)) wpp. Therefore, rn is invading at C
′.
3.3 Proof of the Claims with Birth
Lemma 67 Assume u-Birth. Fix any C ∈ Γ. Then R(C) is unique, R(C)(θ(a))[B(a)] >
0 for any a ∈ Au(C) and there exists Q ∈ W such that Q ⊆ A(C).
Proof. First note that by u-Birth assumption, for any n, if Rn(ω) is unique and
Rn(ω) ∈ Run for some ω ∈ C, then Rn(C) is unique and equal to Rn(ω). Second, note
that Lemma 42 holds with u-Birth assumption. Next we establish two claims.
Claim 1: Fix any n, ω ∈ C and a ∈ A such that θ[ω] = θ(a) and R(ω) is singleton;
then Rn(ω)(θ(a))[Bn(a)] > 0. Suppose not; then by u-Birth assumption, there exists
rn ∈ Run such that ρn(ω)[rn] > 0. By Lemma 42 this implies that there exists ω′ ∈ C such
that Rn(ω
′) = rn. Then by the argument in the previous paragraph Rn(C) = rn ∈ Run.
But this contradicts the supposition.
Claim 2: For any ω ∈ C if R(ω) is singleton then R(C) = R(ω). To show this, it
is sufficient to show that for any ω ∈ C such that R(ω) = r, ρ(ω))[r] = 1. For any such
ω, either θ[ω] ∈ Θu in which case by Claim 1 and u-Birth assumption ρ(ω))[r] = 1 or
θ[ω′] /∈ Θu in which case the same conclusion follows directly from u-Birth assumption.
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Now by Lemma 42, there exists ω ∈ C such that R(ω) is singleton. Then it follows
from Claims 2 and 1 that R(C) is unique, R(C)(θ(a))[B(a)] > 0 for any a ∈ Au(C).
Finally, by Lemma 17 and R(C)(θ(a))[B(a)] > 0 for any a ∈ Au(C), there exists
Q ∈ W such that Q ⊆ A(C).
Proof of Proposition 26. For any C ∈ Γ, by Lemma 67 , A(C) contains some
Q ∈ W ; so u(C) ≤ uW . Hence,the claim in the Proposition follows from Proposition
15.
Lemma 68 Suppose u*-Birth. If Ru ∩Rpure ⊆ R, then A(C) ∈ E for all C ∈ Γ.
Proof. Fix any C ∈ Γ. First note that by u*-Birth assumption a new rule can be born
at any uniform history only if the rule does a best reply to the action profile played at
that history. Hence, it follows that for any ω ∈ C such that θ[ω] = θ(e) for some e ∈ E,
R(ω) is singleton and R(ω)(θ[ω])[e] = 1 it must be that A(C) = e.
Second, fix any r ∈ Ru ∩ Rpure and e′ ∈ E such that r(θ)[e′] = 1 for all θ /∈ Θu.
Clearly such a rule exists and by assumption is feasible.
Third, by Lemma 42, there exists a uniform state ω′ ∈ C such that θ[ω′] ∈ Θu. Also,
by u*-Birth Assumption, ρ(ω′)[r] > 0. Fix any a such that r(θ[ω′])[a] = 1. Then by
Lemma 42, there exists ω′′ ∈ C such that θ[ω′′] = θ(a) and R(ω′′) = r. Now there are
two cases.
Case 1. a ∈ E. Then by r ∈ Ru ∩Rpure and the claim in the first paragraph of this
proof A(C) = a ∈ E.
Case 2. a /∈ E. Suppose the system is at state ω′′ at some date and the following
happens: (i) all agents are assigned the same roles and the same matches as in the
previous period, (ii) all agents adopt the same rule r, (iii) all agents in some match m
implement their rule r and play B(a) and all other agents are subject to action inertia
and play a. Then the system reaches next period state ω̃ such that θ̃[ω̃]T = φ(m,B(a) |
a) and R(ω̃) = r. As a /∈ E, it follows that B(a) 6= a and θ[ω̃] is not uniform. But
then by assumption r(θ[ω̃])[e′] > 0. Hence, by Lemma 42, there exists ω̂ ∈ C such that
θ[ω̂] = θ(e′) and R(ω̂) = r. Then by r ∈ Ru∩Rpure and the claim in the first paragraph
of this proof A(C) = e′ ∈ E.
Proof of Proposition 27. For any C ∈ Γ, by Lemma 68 , A(C) ∈ E; hence
u(C) ≤ uE . So the claim in the Proposition follows from Proposition 15.
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